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I. FROM GRAFFITI IN DARA'A TO CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA

Syria was a latecomer in the political uprisings, which had
developed across Arab countries since the Tunisian revolution of late
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's
2010 and early 2011.1
government and the Ba'ath Party, the country's dominant political
power, had long been successful in curbing earlier protests, 2 labeling
opposition members "terrorists" and arresting many political activists.
Not even Hasan Ali Akleh setting himself on fire on January 26,
2011,3 and subsequent demonstrations in Al-Hasakah in early
February 2011,4 weakened government control.5

1. See Fouad Ajami, The Arab Spring at One. A Year of Living Dangerously
91 (2) FOREIGN AFF. 56 (2012) (highlighting the early developments of the Arab
spring). For a discussion of the Arab spring from a socio-political perspective see
Olivier Roy, The Transformation of the Arab World 23 (3) J. DEMOCRACY 5, 9
(2012), who points out that this largely is an indigenous process:
"The appeal of democracy is not a consequence of the export of the concept of
Western democracy ... It is the political consequence of social and cultural changes
in Arab societies (though these changes, of course, are part of the globalization
process). It is precisely because the Arab Spring is a succession of indigenous
upheavals, centered on particular nation-states and delinked from Western
encroachments, that democracy is seen as both acceptable and desirable."
On the implications for international relations and international law see generally
Peter J. Schraeder, Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution & the Arab Spring: Implications
for InternationalIntervention 56 ORBIS 662 (2012).
2. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Fear Barrier Crumbles in Syrian "Kingdom of
Silence", REUTERS, (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/ussyria-fear-idUSTRE72L3ME20110322 (referring to "humiliation and decades of
repression" and to a 'fear factor' that had made people suspicious that even close
relatives might be informants").
3. DAVID W. LESCH, SYRIA-THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ASSAD 92 (2012).
This act obviously was an allusion to the Tunisian Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed
Bouazizi who set himself on fire on December 17, 2010, thereby catalyzing the
Tunisian Revolution. See LIN NOUEIHED & ALEX WARREN, THE BATTLE FOR THE
ARAB SPRING: REVOLUTION, COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW
ERA 73-75 (2012).

4. See Lauren Williams, Syria Clamps Down on Dissent with Beatings and
(Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
Arrests, THE GUARDIAN
world/2011/feb/24/syria-crackdown-protest-arrests-beatings. See generally Now
THAT WE HAVE TASTED HOPE: VOICES FROM THE ARAB SPRING (Daniel Gumbiner

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss2/4
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The beginning of unrest in Syria is often associated with events in
March 2011, when youngsters wrote anti-government graffiti on the
wall of their school in Dara'a, an agricultural town in Southern Syria.6
The slogan they put up, "ash-sha'b yurTd isqit an-nizlm" meaning
"the people want to bring down the regime," was firmly rooted in the
Arab spring7 and perceived as a call for democracy and greater
freedom in Syria. The local governor in Dara'a came down hard on
the teenagers who were arrested on March 6, 2011 and reportedly
tortured.8 In response to these arrests, locals demanded the release of
the school children, and protestors clashed with local police.9 Within
days, the situation further escalated. Nationwide demonstrations
began with protesters soon demanding the resignation of President
Bashar al-Assad and an end to nearly five decades of Ba'ath Party
rule.'o
After unsuccessful efforts to crackdown on the uprising, and after
equally unsuccessful offers for political reforms and policy changes,"
ed., 2012) (discussing the early Syrian demonstrations).
5. Lesch, supra note 3, at 92 ("[T]his action did not gamer as much attention
as Bouazizi's, nor did it immediately light the fuse to an uprising.").
6. These events are referred to in an initial U.N. report. See Human Rights
Council, Rep. of the Independent Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, para. 27, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011), at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/A.HRC.S-17.2.Add.1_en.pdf.
[hereinafter First Report on Syria]; see also Kareem Fahim & Hwaida Saada,
Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria's War, N.Y. Times (Feb. 8,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/middleeast/a-faceless-teenagerefugee-who-helped-ignite-syrias-war.html?_r- I&.
7. NoUEIHED & WARREN supra note 3, at 227.
8. In Syria, Accounts of Widening Torture: Protester Tells of Cuts, Burns and
Blows During Detention in a Military Hospital, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303654804576341030013131512.
html?mod=googlenews-wsj ("When released, the children, who were as young as
10, bore bum marks from cigarettes and had fingernails torn out, said human-rights
activists and a Deraa resident who said he saw some of them after their release.").
9. See generally, Rania Abouzeid, Syria's Revolt: How Graffiti Stirred an
Uprising,
TIME
(Mar.
22,
2011),
http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,2060788,00.html.
10. See Profile: Syria's ruling Baath Party, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755
(discussing the Baath
Party).
11. For further details, see LESCH, supra note 3, at 69-86.
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including concessions to the majority Sunni and some minority
populations, the Syrian government, in light of anti-government
protests continuing into April 2011, opted for a military response to
the political opposition. On April 25, 2011, the Syrian military
launched a large operation at Dara'a, ostensibly to target terrorists but
in fact trying to end pro-democracy protests.12 Rather than calming
down the situation in Dara'a, these military activities triggered further
anti-government demonstrations all over Syria.
Initially, the protesters did not have military capabilities at their
disposal.13 This, however, changed when soldiers began to desert
from the Syrian army.14 Early defections had already occurred during
the operation in Dara'a as the army (and later, also secret police and
intelligence agents) summarily executed soldiers, who refused to use
lethal force against unarmed protesters.' 5 Soon, deserters began to
form fighting units, and the opposition became more well-equipped
and organized with senior officers and government officials also
defecting.16
Political opposition began to turn into armed insurrection in early
June 2011, with rebel attacks on security forces in Jisr ash-Shugur on
the Syrian-Turkish border and the government sending troops to

12. See generally Anthony Shadid, Syrian Forces Seize Mosque That Was
Uprising's

Symbol,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Apr.

30,

2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html;
Joseph
Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operation and Regional Analysis,
Middle East Security Report 2, INST. STUD. WAR, Dec. 2011, at 13-14, available at

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/StruggleForSyria.pdf.
The
Human Rights Council Independent Commission of Inquiry also refers to military
operations beginning on April 25, 2011. See First Report on Syria, supra note 6,
para. 28.
13.

STEPHEN STARR,

EYE-WITNESS TO THE SYRIAN UPRISING 10 (2012)

(describing the situation as of early 2012 by stating that "the entire world saw
Syria's armed opposition for what it was: a mostly disorganized group with limited
capabilities").
14. Another observer pointed out that "Syria's armed resistance has been made
up of only small units of deserters and local insurgents, all of whom have been
lightly armed." Holliday, supra note 12, at 17.
15. See id., at 21.
16. Jamie Crawford, U.S. sees Syrian military defections beginning to
'accelerate', CNN (June 22, 2012), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/ 2012/06/22/u-ssees-syrian-military-defections-beginning-to-accelerate.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss2/4
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respond." Reportedly, more than 100 security forces were killed and
some 10,000 residents, insurgents and defectors fled to Turkey.18 In
the following weeks, not only the Syrian Army expanded its
operations. On July 29, 2011, parts of the military opposition
announced the formation of the so-called Free Syrian Army.19 A few
weeks later, on August 23, 2011, a political coalition of antigovernment groups was formed, calling itself the Syrian National
Council. 20 A major confrontation between the Free Syrian Army and
government armed forces occurred at the end of September 2011, in
Rastan, which involved tanks and helicopters.2 1 Since October 2011,
the Free Syrian Army has received military support from Turkey, with
its headquarters located in Southern Turkey close to the Syrian
border.2 2 Fighting moved to Homs in November 2011, and also to the
provinces of Hama and Dara'a, with increasing use of tanks and
artillery by the Syrian Army from January 2012 onwards. 2 3

17. Syria vows 'decisive' response in Jisr al-Shughour, BBC NEWS (June 7,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13677200; Syrian unrest:
Army in control of Jisr al-Shughour, BBC NEWS (June 12, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13741106.
18. Syrian unrest: Army in control of Jisr al-Shughour, BBC NEWS (June 12,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13741106.
19. On its website, the Free Syrian Army names September 23, 2011, as the
date of its establishment, referring to the merger of the so-called "Free Officers'
Movement," headed by Hussein Harmoush, and another group set up on July 29,
2011,

by

Reyad

Mous

Al-As'ad.

See About

Us,

FREE SYRIAN

ARMY,

http://www.free-syrian-army.com/en/about-us (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). Other
sources refer to other dates as the Free Syrian Army's inception. See Guide to the
Syrian opposition, BBC News (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-I 5798218.
20. See Guide to the Syrian opposition, supra note 19.
21. Syrian Forces Pound Western City in Battle Against Defectors, CNN
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/ 2011/09/28/world/meast/syria-unrest.
22. Liam Stack, In Slap at Syria Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/world/europe/turkey-issheltering-antigovemment-syrian-militia.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
23. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Int'l Comm'n of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, paras. 43-45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (Feb.
22,
2012),
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
RegularSession/Sessionl9/A-HRC-19-69_en.pdf [hereinafter Second Report on
Syria].
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As part of Kofi Annan's peace plan, the United Nations (U.N.)
mediated a ceasefire period.24 However, after infractions by both
sides the ceasefire failed.2 5 After the killings at Houla on May 25,
2012,26 the conflict increasingly affected the coastal province of
Latakia.2 7 The most prominent international event occurred on June
22, 2012 when a Turkish fighter jet was shot down by Syrian
government forces, killing both pilots. 2 8
During the first period of the uprising, the inhabitants of
Damascus and Aleppo remained largely uninvolved in the antigovernment protests, and these cities were not affected by the fighting.
However, both cities increasingly suffered from July 2012 onwards.
Damascus was seriously affected between July 15 and August 4, 2012
when large numbers of rebels sought to infiltrate the capital and the
Syrian government responded to this operation. 29 Towards the end of
the so-called Operation Damascus Volcano, the government regained

24. S.C. Res. 2042, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012).
25. Syrian ceasefire has failed, says UN chief THE TELEGRAPH (April 19,
/syria/9213122/
2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast
Syrian-ceasefire-has-failed-says-UN-chief.html.
26. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Int'l Comm'n of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, paras. 41-50 & Annex IV para. 1, U.N. Doc.
16, 2012),
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
A/HRC/21/50 (Aug.
HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-50_en.pdf [hereinafter
Third Report on Syria]; see also Human Rights Council, Oral Update of the
Independent Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, para. 88, U.N.
26,
2012),
at
http://www.ohchr.org/
Doc.
A/HRC/20/CRP.1
(June
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ColSyria/OralUpdateJune2012.pdf.
27. Heavy Fighting Erupts in Syria's Latakia Province, REUTERS (Jun. 5,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/05/us-syria-crisis-latakia-idUSBRE8
540IG20120605.
28. Liam Stack, Turkey Vows Action After Downing of Jet by Syria, N.Y.
TIMES, (June 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/world/middleeast/
turkey-promises-retaliation-in-response-to-downing-of-military-jet-by-syria.html.
29. See Andrew Osborn, How "Damascus Volcano" Erupted in Assad's
Stronghold, CHI. TRIB., (July 20, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-0720/business/sns-rt-us-syria-crisis-damascusbre86j l7e-20120720_1_midan-southernhajar-al-aswad-district-assad.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss2/4
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control of the city. Fighting in Aleppo began on July 19, 201230 and is
currently ongoing into 2013.31
After the rebels' military defeat in Damascus, they employed
guerilla tactics, making use of their bases around Damascus. These
guerilla tactics led to counter-attacks by the Syrian Army. 32 Since
mid-August 2012 clashes between rebels and the Syrian Army have
been ongoing in Rif Dimashq, including fighting at the Palestinian
refugee camp Yarmouk in December 2012, a government offensive
against the rebel stronghold of Daraya in February 2013,34 and a rebel
offensive against the Jobar District of Damascus in February 2013.35
Additional fighting affected the province of Hama, where the Syrian
armed opposition began an operation by mid-December 2012, which
was countered by Syrian Army forces. 36 Reportedly, the Syrian Army
began to fire Scud ballistic missiles at the rebels. 37

30. Syria conflict: Troops 'mass before Aleppo battle', BBC NEWS (July 26,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18994124.
31. Barbara Surk, Syria Fighting In Aleppo Intensifies As Rebels Try To
Capture

Key

Airport,

HUFFINGTON

POST

(Feb.

23,

2013),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/23/syria-fighting-in-aleppo_n_2748570.html?utmhp-ref=world.
32. Syrian military retakes airport road after fierce clashes, two Austrian
peacekeepers wounded, RT, (Nov. 29, 2012), http://rt.com/news/syria-damascusairport-clashes-914.
33. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013), at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ColSyria/A.HRC.22.59_en
.pdf [hereinafter Fourth Report on Syria].
34. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syrian Troops Bombard Rebel Posts Around
Capital, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/13/ussyria-crisis-idUSBRE9 1A0MU20130213.
35. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syrian army, Rebels Clash in Damascus, REUTERS
(Feb.
11,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/11/us-syria-crisisdamascus-id USBRE9IAODH2013021 1.
36. Syria's Top Military Policeman Switches Sides, ABC News (Dec. 27,
2012),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-27/head-of-syrian-military-policedefects/4444332 ("Elsewhere, the army took control of three Alawite villages in the
central province of Hama.").
37. Matthew Weaver, Syria Conflict: Assad FiresMore Scuds, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec.
21,
2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-eastlive/2012/dec/21 /syria-conflict-assad-fires-more-scuds-live.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2013], Art. 4

408 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

Apart from providing an overview on how the situation in Syria
has developed since March 2011, the facts on the ground are relevant
not only to discussing the legality and legitimacy of an involvement of
the U.N. Security Council38 and the U.N. Human Rights Council,3 9
but also to determining whether, and if so when, the situation in Syria
developed into an armed conflict.40
II. SECURITY COUNCIL INACTION AND
COUNCIL ACTIVISM

HUMAN RIGHTS

The organized international community' S41 response to the Syrian
crisis was slow and ambiguous, 42 especially compared to the cohesive
response to Libya's revolution. 43 Diverse political preferences and
resulting reactions of individual states prevented the international
community from taking more coherent action. Identifying the
different groups of actors contributes to a better understanding of what
happened in the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Human Rights
Council, respectively.

38. See infra Part II.B.
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. See infra Part III.A.
41. The primary international organizations addressing the Syrian uprising are
the Arab League, NATO, and the United Nations.
42. The neighbours:Meddling at their peril-Syria'swar is both worrying the
region and infecting it, 404 ECONOMIsT 8802 (Sep. 15, 2012); Tony Karon, Five
Reasons Why the Assad Regime Survives, TIME WORLD (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://world.time.com/2012/08/30/five-reasons-why-the-assad-regime-survives
("Not only is the international community divided over Syria, but even those
countries most supportive of the rebellion have not settled on a common strategy,
while the disarray among the Syrian opposition further deepens disquiet over
intervention.").
43. The military intervention in Libya, authorized by the U.N. Security
Council, and its contextualization with the Arab Spring, the responsibility to protect,
and regime change, has been discussed intensely. See Simon Chesterman, "Leading
from Behind": The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and
Humanitarian Intervention After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 279 (2011);

Stephan Hobe, The Responsibility to Protect and Security Council Action in Libya,
51 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 502 (2011); Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military
Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 355 (2012); Catherine
Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 298
(2012).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss2/4
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A. Governments' Responses to the Situation in Syria
In light of the fact that the political and military conflict in Syria
is and was linked to the Arab spring, 44 the reaction of Arab states and
pertinent international organizations is of primary interest. During the
early days of the uprising, most governments in the region expressed
their support for the Syrian government. 45 However, governments
began to side with opposition groups when fighting intensified and
numbers of wounded and dead among the Syrian population
increased.46
First and foremost, Saudi Arabia and Qatar moved away from
Assad eventually providing rebel forces with weapons-many of
which now seem to have reached hardline Islamic jihadists. 4 7 Initially
Saudi Arabia and Qatar covertly provided weapons to rebel forces;
however, by spring 2012, the countries announced they would begin
arming the opposition.4 8 By the end of 2012, reports indicated that
Qatar supported Sunni Islamists in Syria. 49 There is no agreement
among political and military analysts on the impact of such military

44. Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: from 'Authoritarian Upgrading' to
Revolution?, 88 INT'L AFF. 95, 107 (2012).
45. See Richard Gowen, The EU and Syria: everything but force? (Jan. 26,
2012), http://www.iss.europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-page/article/the-eu-and-syriaeverything-but-force ("Initially, Arab countries were divided over whether to
support the U.N. monitoring, but they have increasingly given it their backing. The
deployment of Arab League observers to Syria in December failed to deter the
government from continuing attacks on civilians.").
46. Id.
47. David E. Sanger, Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
14,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/
world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?_r-0.
48. Karen DeYoung, Saudi, Qatari Plans to Arm Syrian Rebels Risk
Overtaking Cautious Approach Favored by U.S., WASH. POsT, (March 2, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/saudi-qatari-plans-to-armsyrian-rebels-risk-overtaking-cautious-approach-favored-byus/2012/03/01/gIQArWQflRstory.html.
49. Tony Karon, The Qatar Conundrum: The Emirate That Arms Syria's
Rebels
Also
Embraces
Hamas,
TIME
(Oct
24,
2012),
http://world.time.com/2012/10/24/the-qatar-conundrum-the-emirate-that-armssyrias-rebels-also-embraces-hamas.
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support,50 which from an international law perspective is not
necessarily lawful."
In contrast to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Iran has remained a firm
ally of the Assad government.5 2 Iran provided the regime with arms,
technical support, and even combat troops. 5 3 Reportedly, technical
support included unmanned aerial vehicles. 54 Iran also provided
indirect support to the Syrian government by training Hezbollah
militants in Lebanon, who were then deployed to Syria.5 5 In January
2013, an exchange of captives between rebels and government forces
included Iranians, seemingly members of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard. 56

50.

See CHATHAM HOUSE, MEETING SUMMARY, SYRIA: PROSPECTS FOR

INTERVENTION (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East
/0812syria-summary.pdf; see
also Rachel Kleinfeld, The Casefor Arming Syrian Rebels, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24,
2013),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/24/russia-s-foreign-and-securitypolicy-update/fktt.
51. Generally, foreign states are not normally allowed to provide help to
armed opposition groups in a non-international armed conflict, unless the
government receives foreign help (one may argue in favor of a right of counterintervention in such a case); once the armed opposition has been recognized as
belligerent, the rules of neutrality will even prevent foreign assistance provided to
the government. See Thilo Marauhn & Zacharie F. Ntoubandi, Armed Conflict, NonInternational, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW, para. 41

(Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 2011), availableat www.mpepil.com.
52. Ali Akbar Dareini, Iran Reaffirms Syria, Assad Alliance As Key To
'Resistance Front' Against

Israel, HUFFINGTON

POST

(Jan.

26,

2013),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/26/iran-reaffirms-syria-assad-allianc
e_n
2557611 .html.
53. Karim Sadjadpour, Iran Will Be Central No Matter the Outcome, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ roomfordebate/2012/08/08/how-toend-the-war-in-syrialiran-will-be-central-no-matter-the-outcome;
Paul Salem, A
New Balance of Power if Syria Shifts Away from Iran, THE NAT'L (Dec. 9, 2011),
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/a-new-balance-ofpower-if-syria-shifts-away-from-iran.
54. Nick Paton Walsh, Iranian Drones Guiding Syrian Attacks, Rebels Say,
CNN (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/31/world/meast/syriadrones/index.html.
55. Dareini,supra note 52.
56. Babak Dehghanpisheh, Syria Releases 2,130 Captives to Rebels in
Exchange for 48 Iranian Prisoners, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-09/world/36232738__syrian-

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss2/4
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In the Arab world, notwithstanding the diverse attitudes of
governments towards the Syrian conflict, the Arab League condemned
the Assad regime's violent response to the protests and suspended
Syria's membership. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation also
suspended Syria's membership.
A second noteworthy reaction to the developments in Syria is that
of the Turkish government, particularly in light of the close relations
The Turkish
between the two states before the uprising.
of the Assad
response
violent
the
condemned
only
administration not
regime to protests but also called for President Assad's departure from
office. From October 2011 onwards, the Free Syrian Army was
allowed into Turkey and provided with a base for operations. 59 On
June 22, 2012, as previously mentioned, Syrian government forces
shot down a Turkish fighter jet.60 The facts, however, are not
sufficiently clear to allow a definite assessment from the perspective
of public international law. Should Turkish claims be true that the
incident occurred in international airspace, then the Syrian shooting
was a violation of Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter. 6 1 However, if
government-iranians-free-syrian-army.
57. The Arab League decision was made at an emergency summit. See League
of Arab States, Council Res. 7438 (Nov. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.lasportal.org/wps/wcm/connect/65bd7b80495235058b6fef7abaae88c3/L
AS+RES+7438+ENGLISH.pdf?MOD=AJPERES; see also David Batty & Jack
Shenker, Syria suspended from Arab League, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2011),
The
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league.
Organization of Islamic Cooperation at its Fourth Extraordinary Islamic Conference
Summit on August 14 and 15, 2012, adopted Resolution 2/4-EX (IS) on the situation
in Syria. Org. Islamic Cooperation, On the Situation in Syria, Res. 2/4-EX (IS), 7-8,
O.I.C. Doc. No. OIC/EX-SUM-4/2012/RES/FINAL, at pp. 7-8 (Aug. 15, 2012),
available at http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/ex-4/is ex4_res-en.pdf.
58. See Abigail Fielding-Smith, Obama and Erdogan Discuss Assad Exit, FIN.
TIMES (July 31, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/060d231a-da6O- liel-a41300144feab49a.html#axzz2MVYhehRW.
59. Stack, supra note 22; see also Sinan Ulgen, Turkey's Syria Conundrum,
http://nationalinterest.org/
2012),
24,
(Aug.
INTEREST
NAT.
THE
commentary/turkeys-syria-conundrum-73 85.
60. See Stack, supra note 28, and accompanying text. For further information,
see BBC Middle East, Turkish Warplane Downed by Syria 'May Have Crossed
Border', BBC NEWS (June 23, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-18562210.
61. In international airspace, any attack on a foreign aircraft, whether civilian
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Syrian claims are valid-that the fighter was shot by a range limited
surface-to-air missile-the fighter likely violated Syrian airspace, and
Syria's reaction might have been justified.62 The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) discussed the matter under Article 4 of
the North Atlantic Treaty, 63 rather than taking action under the
Treaty's Article 5.64 In response to clashes on the Syrian-Turkish
border in late 2012, Turkey asked for NATO support to defend its
borders, and Patriot missile batteries were delivered in early 2013.65
Turning to Europe and the United States, their respective
governments were generally sympathetic towards the uprisings linked
to the Arab spring. This also stimulated their support for protesters in
Syria and freedom of speech. However, neither the United States nor
its allies limited themselves to mere democracy promotion. They not
only supported peaceful change, but explicitly called for President
Assad's departure from power. 66 In addition to political pressure, the
United States and its European allies sought to make use of pertinent
international organizations, primarily the U.N., in order to put an end
or military, amounts to a use of force in international relations, which is prohibited
under Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter, except in situations of self-defense. See
Antonio Cassese, The International Community's "Legal" Response to Terrorism,
38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 596 (1989).

62. Even if the Turkish jet had violated Syrian airspace, this did not
automatically entitle Syria to shoot down the jet. Whereas, the shooting of a civilian
airliner, even in a country's own airspace, is prohibited according to Article 3bis (a)
of the 1944 Chicago Convention. Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3bis (a), May 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M.
705. The downing a military aircraft, however, depends on the threat arising from
its entry into foreign airspace. See Brian E. Foont, Shooting Down Civilian Aircraft:
Is There an InternationalLaw?, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 695 (2007).
63. Press Release, NAC, Statement on the shooting down of a Turkish aircraft
by Syria (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
news_88652.htm.
64. On Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, see Thilo Marauhn, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW,

paras. 15-17 (Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 2011), available at www.mpepil.com.
65. Press Release, NATO, Spokesperson's Statement on the Deployment of
Patriot
Missiles
to
Turkey
(Dec.
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_93430.htm.
66. Steven Lee Myers, U.S. and Allies Say Syria Leader Must Step Down,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
18,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/19/world/middleeast/1 9diplo.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
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to the ongoing fighting and legitimize regime change in Syria. 67
However, due to Russia and China blocking U.N. Security Council
resolutions imposing sanctions on Syria this strategy largely failed.6 8
In the course of 2012, the United States as well as the United
Kingdom and France, began providing physical support to opposition
forces, such as communications and medical equipment. 69 Reportedly,
Cyprus-based British intelligence support for Turkey found its way to
the Free Syrian Army, 70 which also seemed to benefit from CIA
training and advice.n As to strategic interests, many argue the West

has been interested in cutting the political and military links between
Iran, Syria, and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah. 72
On the other hand, Russia, as a long-time ally of Syria, continued
Siding with the Syrian
to support the Assad administration.
government's claim to defend public order and suppress terrorist
unrest, Russia stressed the principle of non-intervention and argued

67. See France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011); Bahrain,
Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America:
Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012).
See U.N. S.C. Rep. The Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc.
68.
S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011) (discussing Security Council's Draft Resolution U.N. Doc.
S/2011/612 vetoed by China and the Russian Federation); U.N. S.C. Rep. The
Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711 (Feb. 4, 2012) (discussing draft
resolution U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 vetoed by China and the Russian Federation (13-02)).
69. Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret U.S. Support for
Syrian

Rebels,

REUTERS

(Aug.

1,

2012),

http://www.reuters.com/article/

2012/08/01/us-usa-syria-obama-order-idUSBRE87010K20120801; Syria Conflict:
UK to Give Extra £5m to Opposition Groups, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19205204.
70. Syria Rebels 'Aided By British Intelligence', SKY NEWS (Aug. 19, 2012),
http://news.sky.com/story/974300/syria-rebels-aided-by-british-intelligence.
71. Jay Solomon & Nour Malas, U.S. Bolsters Ties to Fighters in Syria, WALL
ST. J. (June 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230
3410404577464763551149048.html#.
72. Paul Saleem, Can Hezbollah Weather the Arab Spring?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (June 19, 2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/canhezbollah-weather-the-arab-spring.
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that political change in Syria should not result from outside pressure.7 3
Even though towards the end of 2012 Russian politicians
acknowledged a process of destabilization of the Syrian government,
Moscow continued to support Assad's government.7 4 Russia's
position is partly informed by the fact that Syria hosts a Russian naval
base, electronic surveillance facility, and airbase.75 There are also
more than 30,000 Russian civilians in Syria.7 6 Furthermore, Syria's
military equipment largely originates in Russia. Military support for a
government involved in suppressing political unrest, even if this
amounts to a non-international armed conflict, is not normally
contrary to international law,77 unless the U.N. Security Council has
adopted pertinent sanctions.7 8 A different matter is assessing the
legality of Turkey's actions. In October 2012, Turkey forced a Syrian
airplane returning from Moscow to land in Ankara. 79 Indeed, there
are distinct rules for the transportation of military materials onboard
civilian airliners across the airspace of other countries.80
73. Jaime A. FlorCruz, Russia, China and Partners Callfor Non-Intervention
in Syria, Iran, CNN (June 7, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/07
/world/asia/china-russia-syria.
74. Ellen Barry & Steven Erlanger, Russia Offers a Dark View of Assad's
Chancesfor Survival, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
12/14/world/middleeast/russian-envoy-says-syrian-leader-is-losing-control.html.
75. The Russian naval base is located in Tartus, the electronic surveillance
facility is located in Latakia, and the airbase facility is located at Tadmur. On
Russia's naval base, see Christopher Harmer, Backgrounder - Russian Naval Base
Tartus,

INST.

STUD.

WAR,

July

31,

2012,

available

at

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder-RussianNavalB
aseTartus.pdf. On the Russian presence in Syria, see Julian Borger, Russian Military
Presence in Syria Poses Challenge to US-led Intervention, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 23,
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/23/syria-crisis-russian-militarypresence.
76. Michael Jansen, Russians Not Leaving Syria, Says Embassy, IRISH TIMES
(Jan.
23,
2013),
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2013/0123/
1224329189096.html.
77. Marauhn & Ntoubandi, supra note 51, para. 41.
78. This only refers to sanctions adopted on the basis of Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.
79. Nick Tattersall, Turkey Says Syrian Plane Carried Russian Munitions,
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/us-syria-crisisidUSBRE88JOX72012101 1.
80. This has to be assessed in light of Article 3bis (b) and (c), and Article 35 of
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There have been multiple ways to analyze the involvement of
external actors in the internal Syrian conflict. Some analysts have
seen this as a confrontation between Western strategic interests on one
hand, and Russia's (sometimes sided by China) interests on the
other. 8' Analysts also interpreted the conflict in religious terms
between Sunni and Shiite states, with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar
on the Sunni site, and Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria supporting Shia
Islam. 82 Closely linked to the latter view, is the enormous number of
fighters involved in the conflict, including jihadists and extremist
groups.8 3
B. Inaction of the U.N. Security Council
It is against the background of these reactions that the role of the
U.N. can be more closely described and assessed. The U.N. Security
Council ("Council") first addressed the situation in Syria on August 3,
2011, when it issued a presidential statement, expressing "its grave
concern at the deteriorating situation in Syria" and "profound regret at
the death of many hundreds of people." 84 Without identifying
pertinent rules of international law, the Council further condemned
"the widespread violations of human rights and the use of force
against civilians by the Syrian authorities." 8 5 The Council called for
"an immediate end to all violence" 86 and it also called "on the Syrian
authorities to fully respect human rights and to comply with their
obligations under applicable international law."87 Notwithstanding the
the Chicago Convention. See Foont, supra note 62.
81. Daniel Treisman, Why Russia Protects Syria's Assad, CNN, (Feb. 3,
2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/02/opinion/treisman-russia-syria.
82. Charles M. Sennott, Syria's Civil War Emphasizes Middle East's Deep
Sunni-Shia Division, GLOBALPOST (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/
dispatches/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/syria-civil-war-sunni-shia-dividemiddle-east-oic.
83. See Elizabeth O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, Middle East Security Report 6, INsT.
FOR
THE
STUD.
OF
WAR,
Sept.
2012,
available
at
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria- 17SEPT.pdf.
84. S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/16, paras. 1 & 2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/16
(Aug. 3, 2011).
85. Id. para. 2.
86. Id. para. 3.
87. Id. para. 4.
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fact that the Council in its presidential statement called for a Syrianled political solution, it explicitly reaffirmed "its strong commitment
to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria."88
It took the Council until March 21, 2012, to issue a second
presidential statement on the situation in Syria. This statement was
preceded by two draft resolutions, which the Council was not able to
agree upon. The first draft resolution, submitted on October 4, 2011,
by France, Germany, Portugal, and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 89 in its operative part, sought to strongly
condemn "the continued grave and systematic human rights violations
and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities. "90 The
draft resolution included demands for the Syrian authorities, to not
only end human rights violations and terminate the use of force
against civilians, but also to improve the humanitarian situation in
crisis areas and ensure the return of those who fled the violence to
their homes. 9 1 The draft was not adopted because it was vetoed by
China and Russia. 9 2
On February 4, 2012, a second draft was presented by Bahrain,
Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco,
Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States. 93 The draft condemned "the
continued widespread and gross violations of human rights and
88. Id. para. 6.
89. France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland: draft resolution, supra note 67.
90. Id. para. 1.
91. Id. para. 4.
92. U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627, supra note 68. There were ten votes in favor, two
against, and four abstentions. Id. at 2. In the Council debate, Russia referred to "the
principle of non-intervention, including military," while at the same time stating not
to be "advocates of the Al-Assad regime," and condemning the "repression of
protests by peaceful demonstrators." Id. at 3-4. China called upon the international
community to "fully respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity." Id. at 5. Germany criticized the Council for not adopting the draft:
"Today the Council failed to live up to its responsibilities under the Charter of the
United Nations." Id. at 10. Russia and China both referred to their own issues to
table a draft resolution. Id. at 3-4, 5.
93. France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution, supra note 67.
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fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities."9 4 In its second
operative paragraph, it included the demand "that the Syrian
government immediately put an end to all human rights violations."95
The draft condemned "all violence, irrespective of where it comes
from,"96 and it eventually demanded that the Syrian government
comply "with the Plan of Action of the League of Arab States of
November 2, 2011 and its decision of January 22, 2012."97 Again,
the draft was vetoed by China and Russia, and hence, was not
adopted. 98
The second presidential statement on the situation in Syria, issued
by the Council on March 21, 2012, expresses the Council's full
support for the initial six-point proposal submitted to the Syrian
authorities by Joint Special Envoy for the U.N. and the League of
Arab States, Kofi Annan. 99 Expressly, the statement supports the
efforts of the former U.N. Secretary-General "to bring an immediate
end to all violence and human rights violations, secure humanitarian
access, and facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic,
plural political system."100 Kofi Annan had presented the proposal to
the Council on March 16, 2012. It included a commitment to "an
inclusive Syrian-led political process," ending fighting and achieving
a U.N.-supervised cessation of armed violence, ensuring the provision
of humanitarian assistance and a release of arbitrarily detained
individuals, safeguarding freedom of movement in the country for
journalists and respect for basic political liberties, including freedom

94. Id. para. 1.
95. Id. para. 2.
96. Id. para. 3.
97. Id. para. 5.
98. U.N. S.C. Rep. The Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711
(Feb. 4, 2012). There were thirteen votes in favor of the resolution and two against
it. Id. at 2. In the debate, Russia criticized the draft because it "did not adequately
reflect the true state of affairs in Syria." Id. at 9. China reiterated its call for
respecting the "sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria." Id.
The United States made a strong statement, declaring "(t)he United States is
disgusted that a couple of members of this Council continue to prevent us from
fulfilling our sole purpose here." Id. at 5.
99. S.C. Pres. Statement 2012/6, U.N. Doc S/PRST/2012/6 (Mar. 21, 2012).
100. Id.
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of association.' 0 ' While aiming at ending the use of force in Syria, the
six-point proposal also sought a political solution to the conflict, and
did not expressly include but pointed towards the establishment of
political democracy in Syria. 102 This, in itself, might have gone too
far for the Assad government and at least contributed to the failure of
this process and the eventual demise of Kofi Annan.103
At this point in time, however, the Council first and foremost
aimed at putting an end to the violence in Syria. It issued another
presidential statement on April 5, 2012, calling upon the Syrian
authorities to comply with the agreement reached in negotiations of
the Assad government with Kofi Annan to cease troop movements
toward population centers and begin pullbacks away from those areas
by the agreed deadline.10 4 The Council also called "upon all parties,
including the opposition, to cease armed violence in all its forms
within 48 hours of the implementation in their entirety by the Syrian
Government" 0 5 of the measures agreed with the Special Envoy, and it
signaled its intention to authorize a mechanism to monitor the end of
violence.10 6 A few days later the Council adopted its first resolution on
the situation in Syria: U.N. SC Resolution 2042 of 2012 ("Resolution
2042").107 This resolution included two major elements: an

101. Id.
102. On the United Nation's approach towards democratic governance, see
Thilo Marauhn, The United Nations and Political Democracy, in DEMOKRATIEPERSPEKTIVEN. FESTSCHRIFT FOR BRUN-OTTO BRYDE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 659

(Michael Biuerle et al. eds., 2013), with the author arguing, among others, that
"Libya and Syria are illustrations of the UN Security Council being trapped in
power politics rather than being the optimum organ for supporting political
democracy." Id. at 671.
103. It is illustrative that Kofi Annan, in a statement to the press on the
occasion of his resignation as Special Envoy, declared: "Without serious, purposeful
and united international pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is
impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place,
and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a political process."
Kofi Annan resigns as UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syrian crisis, U.N.
2012),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID
2,
(Aug.
NEWS
=42609#.UTTP3jnnDvY.
104. S.C. Pres. Statement 2012/10, U.N. Doc S/PRST/2012/10 (Apr. 5, 2012).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Statements made in the U.N. Security Council after the adoption of
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endorsement by the Council of the six-point plan and an authorization
of an advance team to monitor the cease-fire in Syria.
In the first element, the Council reaffirmed "its full support for"
the plan and called for its "urgent, comprehensive, and immediate
implementation."' 08 The plan was annexed to the text of Resolution
2042. However, because the Council neither expressly determined the
existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression" under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, nor expressly stated
that it was acting on the basis of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
Resolution 2042 does not attach legally binding force to the six-point
plan on the basis of the U.N. Charter, in particular, on the basis of
Article 25.109 Thus, it would be very difficult to derive more than just
political support for the plan from the Council's adoption of
Resolution 2042.
In contrast, the second element of the resolution "to authorize an
advance team of up to 30 unarmed military observers to liaise with the
parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full cessation
of armed violence in all its forms by all parties,"''o is a decision,
which unambiguously binds all other U.N. organs. Although clearly
binding in regards to the U.N., Resolution 2042 does not impose any
specific obligations upon the parties to the conflict other than those
directly related to the establishment of the advance team. It is
noteworthy that the obligations imposed upon the parties to cooperate
with the advance team were phrased in remarkably softer language,
using the phrase "calls upon.""
Based upon Resolution 2042, the Secretary-General, on April 19,
2012, submitted a proposal to the Council for a U.N. supervision
mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS) for an initial period
of three months." 2 The Council followed this proposal in light of its
Resolution 2042 are included in U.N. Doc. S/PV.6751. U.N. S.C. Rep. The
Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6751 (Apr. 14, 2012).
108. S.C. Res. 2042, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012).
109. On the binding force of U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter, see Michael Wood, United Nations, Security Council,
paras. 13, 23 in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW (Rildiger Wolfrum
ed., 2007), availableat www.mpepil.com.
110. S.C. Res. 2042, supra note 108, para. 7.
I11. Id. paras. 7-8.
1i2. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Apr. 19, 2012 from Secretary-
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concern "over ongoing violence and reports of casualties which have
escalated again . .. noting that the cessation of armed violence in all
its forms is therefore clearly incomplete,"" 3 and adopted Resolution
2043 on April 21, 2012.114 Resolution 2043 confirmed the Council's
earlier activities and assessments and called upon the parties to end
violence. It relied on the "Preliminary Understanding agreed between
the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations" on April 19,
2012,"1 which established UNSMIS and defined its mandate "to
monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties
and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Envoy's
six-point proposal.""16
While the establishment of similar missions had often been a
meaningful first step in not only bringing an end to violence in a
conflict but also paving the way for a political solution, UNSMIS
nearly from the first day of its operations onwards was confronted
with so many difficulties" 7 that the Council finally decided to bring
the mission to an end. Formally speaking, the Council, on July 20,
2012 renewed the mandate of UNSMIS for another thirty days." 8
However, the Council, in operating paragraph three of Resolution
2059 clearly expressed "its willingness to renew the mandate of
UNSMIS thereafter only in the event that the Secretary-General
reports and the Council confirms the cessation of the use of heavy
weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides sufficient

General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2012/238
(Apr. 19, 2012).
113. S.C. Res. 2043, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012).
114. For the statements made after the unanimous adoption of the resolution,
see U.N. S.C. Rep. The Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6756 (Apr. 21,
2012).
115. U.N. Secretary-General, Note Dated Apr. 23, 2012 from the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. S/2012/250 (Apr. 23, 2012).
116. S.C. Res. 2043, supra note 113, para. 6.
117. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043 (2012), para. 49-57, U.N. Doc.
S/2012/523 (July 6, 2012) (outlining options for future of UNSMIS of July 6, 2012,
U.N. Doc. S/2012/523).
118. S.C. Res. 2059, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2059 (Apr. 20, 2012)
(referring, already, to a "final period").
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to allow UNSMIS to implement its mandate."" 9 As this was not the
case, UNSMIS came to an end at midnight on August 19, 2012.
It is important to take into account that the Council's Resolution
2059 was only agreed upon after Russia and China had vetoed, on
July 19, 2012, a draft resolution based upon Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, which would not only have extended the mandate of
UNSMIS, but also demanded verifiable compliance that the Syrian
government cease the use of heavy weapons against civilians, or
otherwise face sanctions.' 20 The draft resolution, tabled by France,
Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States, would have stepped up
Council involvement;121 but, precisely for this reason, the resolution
seemed to be unacceptable for Russia and China.' 22 As a consequence,
formal Council involvement in Syria largely came to an end by
August 19, 2012.
C. Actions Taken by the U.N. GeneralAssembly and the U.N. Human
Rights Council
In contrast to the Security Council's limited action, which from
the perspective of the victims might also be labeled inaction, the U.N.
General Assembly ("General Assembly") and the U.N. Human Rights
Council (HRC) developed a more activist approach. The General
Assembly, on December 19, 2011, adopted a non-binding
resolution,12 3 calling upon the Syrian authorities "to immediately put
an end to all human rights violations;"' 24 "to implement the Plan of

119. Id.
120. S.C. Res. 538, U.N. Doc. S/RES/538 (July 19, 2012).
121. Among others, Syria would have been faced with sanctions under Article
41 of the U.N. Charter in the case of non-compliance. Id.
122. As stated by Russia, "(t)he Russian delegation had very clearly and
consistently explained that we simply cannot accept a document under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, that would open the way for the pressure of
sanctions and later for external military involvement in Syrian domestic affairs."
S.C. Res. 6810, at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV/6810 (July 19, 2012). Among others, the
United Kingdom was "appalled by the decision of Russia and China to veto the draft
resolution." Id. at 2.
123. G.A. Res. 66/176, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/176 (Dec. 19, 2011).
124. Id. para. 2.
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Action of the League of Arab States;" 25 and "to comply with Human
Rights Council resolutions S-16/1 and S-17/1, including by
cooperating fully and effectively with the independent international
commission of inquiry."126 Three months later, the General Assembly
addressed not only the Syrian government, but all parties to the
conflict, and, adopting its Resolution 66/253 on February 16, 2012,
condemned "all violence, irrespective of where it comes from" and
called upon "all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, including armed
groups, to stop all violence or reprisals immediately." 27 The General
Assembly in Resolution 66/253 reiterated its calls upon the Syrian
authorities as already included in Resolution 66/176 of December
2011. In adopting Resolution 66/253B on August 3, 2012, the
General Assembly supported the Council's efforts and demanded "that
all parties immediately and visibly implement Security Council
resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) in order to achieve a
cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties." 28
The most activist U.N. organ in respect to Syria turned out to be
the HRC.129 Already, on April 29, 2011, the HRC addressed the
situation in Syria. In its Resolution S-16/1, the HRC "unequivocally"
condemned "the use of lethal violence against peaceful protestors by
the Syrian authorities and the hindrance of access to medical
treatment" and urged "the Syrian Government to immediately put an
end to all human rights violations." 30 Most important in this
125. Id. para. 3.
126. Id. para. 5. The Commission referred to by the General Assembly is the
Commission set up by the Human Rights Council.
127. G.A. Res. 66/253, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253 (Feb. 16, 2012).
128. G.A. Res. 66/253, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253 B (Aug. 3, 2012).
129. This activist approach only comes to the fore in light of what
commentators have criticized about the U.N. Security Council, often misperceiving
the different role of these organs-with the Security Council focusing on peace and
security, and the Human Rights Council focusing on human rights. See, e.g., PierreMarie Dupuy, Back to the Future of a MultilateralDimension of the Law of State
Responsibilityfor Breaches of "ObligationsOwed to the InternationalCommunity
as a Whole", 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1059, 1069 (2012) ("[T]he organic limits still
affecting the United Nations, with no real hope that any specific development in this
respect may be realistically expected, as dramatically illustrated by the cruel lack of
efficiency of the again paralysed Security Council in the face of the continuous trail
of crimes against humanity committed in Syria.").
130. Human Rights Council, The Current Human Rights Situation in the
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Resolution is the request of the HRC addressed to the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights "to dispatch urgently a mission
to the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate all alleged violations of
international human rights law and to establish the facts and
circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated, with a
view to avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability." 13 ' Based
upon an initial fact-finding report, 13 2 the HRC, on August 22, 2011,
adopted Resolution S-17/1 and decided:
[T]o dispatch urgently an independent international commission of
inquiry, to be appointed by the President of the Human Rights
Council, to investigate all alleged violations of international human
rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to
establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such
violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to
identify those responsible with a view of ensuring that perpetrators

of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against
humanity, are held accountable.1 33

On September 12, 2011, the President of the HRC appointed
Paulo Pinheiro as the Commission of Inquiry's ("Commission")
chairperson, and Yakin Ertiirk and Karen Koning AbuZayd as
members of the Commission.' 34 Yakin Erturk stepped down from her
position as Commissioner in March 2012,135 and in September 2012,
Syrian Arab Republic in the Context of Recent Events, para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/S-16/1
(Apr. 29, 2011), at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/16/docs/A%20-HRC-RES-S-16-1.pdf.
131. Id. para. 7.

132. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,
U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/18/53
(Aug.
22,
2011), at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G 11/159/68/PDF/G 1115968.pdfOpenElement.
133. Human Rights Council, Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-17/1 (Aug. 23, 2011), at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/SyriaCallSubmission.
aspx.
134.
Press Release, Human Rights Council, President of Human Rights
Council Appoints International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Human Rights
Violations in Syria (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD= 11369&LanglD=E.
135. Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Syria investigator resigns to protest lack of
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Carla del Ponte and Vitit Muntarbhom were appointed as new
members of the Commission.13 6 The Commission began its work
immediately after the appointment of its members. So far, the
Commission has presented four comprehensive reports, all of which
will be addressed in more detail in the next section of this article.
These four reports were published on November 23, 2011,137

February 22, 2012,138 August 15, 2012,139 and February 5, 2013.140
The HRC discussed each of these reports in detail and a number of
resolutions were adopted by the HRC in response.
On December 2, 2011, the HRC adopted Resolution S-18/1,
which strongly condemned, among others, the "continued widespread,
systematic and gross violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms by the Syrian authorities"1 4 1 and the "attacks against
civilians in cities and villages across the country." 42 The HRC urged
"the Syrian authorities to respect the popular will, aspirations and
demands of its people."1 43 The same HRC resolution also considered
"establish[ing] the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic once the mandate of the
commission of inquiry ends."l44 However, the HRC extended the
Commission's mandate, among others, on the basis of Resolution
21/26 of September 28, 2012.14' Also, the Commission conducted a
access, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/ussyria-un-rights-idUSBRE82P 14K20120326.
136. Press Release, Human Rights Council, Council Adopts Five Texts,
Appoints Members of Advisory Committee, Commission of Inquiry on Syria (Sept.
28,
2012)
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewslD=1312712608&LanglD=E.
137. First Report on Syria, supra note 6.
138. Second Report on Syria, supra note 23.
139. Third Report on Syria, supra note 26.
140. Fourth Report on Syria, supra note 33.
141. Human Rights Council, The Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab
Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-18/1 (Dec., 5, 2011), at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G 11/1 72/09/PDF/G 111 7209.pdf?OpenElement.
142. Id. para. 2(a).
143. Id. para. 2(i).
144. Id. para. 10.
145. Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab
Republic, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/26 (Oct. 17, 2012), at http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G 12/176/37/PDF/G 121763 7.pdfOpen
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special inquiry into the events in Al-Houleh, mandated by the HRC in
its resolution S-19/1 of June 1, 2012.146
In its Resolution 19/22 of March 23, 2012, the HRC not only
decided to extend the mandate of the Commission, but it expressed
"deep concern at the humanitarian situation in Syria" and reiterated its
demands addressed to the Syrian government.147 The HRC decided
"to transmit the updated reports of the commission of inquiry to all
relevant United Nations bodies and the Secretary-General for
appropriate action,"1 4 8 thus indicating that it perceived a need for
further action, including possibly decisions to be taken by the Council.
In Resolution S-19/1, the HRC condemned the atrocities that had
earlier occurred in El-Houleh, indicating that fact-finding of the
Commission may also serve "to hold to account those responsible."l 49
In subsequent resolutions, the HRC continued to call for an end of
violence and for a peaceful solution, stressing the importance of the
Commission's fact-finding, and to again refer to the need of holding
perpetrators accountable.
Against this background-juxtaposing the Council's inaction and
the HRC's activism-the situation in Syria raises a number of
questions. In a nutshell these questions can be addressed by analyzing
the role of the HRC and its Commission. Has the situation in Syria
developed into a non-international armed conflict? If so, what are the
applicable rules? Does this have an impact on the fact-finding
mandate of the Commission, which was set up by a human rights body
and not by a body competent to address compliance with the law of
war? To what extent is there an overlap between the law of armed
conflict and international human rights law, which the Commission
and the HRC have rightly taken into account? How does the
Element (addressing the prolongation of the Commission's mandate); see also id. at
para. 10, (adding "war crimes" to the substantive mandate of the Commission).
146. Human Rights Council, The Deteriorating Situation of Human Rights in
the Syrian Arab Republic, and The Recent Killings in El-Houleh, U.N. Doc.
at
(June
1,
2012),
A/HRC/RES/S-19/1
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/RES/S-19/1.
147. Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab
Republic, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/19/22, (Apr. 10, 2012), at http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/JNDOC/GEN/Gl2/130/34/PDF/Gl213034.pdfOpenElement.
148. Id. para. 21.
149. See H.R.C. Res. S-19/1, supra note 146, para. 7.
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distinction between human rights law and the law of armed conflict
impact fact-finding procedures?
And eventually, have the
Commission and the HRC, by attempting to be all-inclusive, run the
risk of blurring the lines and thereby weakening compliance with the
law applicable to the situation in Syria?
III. THE RISK OF BEING ALL-INCLUSIVE: BLURRING THE LINES

The Commission was set up with a clear mandate, namely, to
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law
since March 2011.150 This was to include investigations into "crimes
against humanity."151 It is noteworthy that the Commission mandate
included, "where possible, to identify those responsible with a view of
ensuring that perpetrators of violations" of applicable human rights
law are held accountable. 152 The Commission, in interpreting its
mandate, distinguished between establishing the facts of human rights
violations, only requiring "reasonable suspicion."' 53 In contrast, the
second component of its mandate needs a higher burden of proof by
requiring the identification of "those responsible."1 54
A. Does the Situation in Syria Amount to a
Non-InternationalArmed Conflict?
In its first report, the Commission voiced concern "that the armed
violence in the Syrian Arab Republic risks rising to the level of an
'internal armed conflict' under international law."155 The Commission
pointed out that international human rights law, according to the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, continues to apply
during armed conflict, though it is modified by the law of armed
conflict as lex specialis, in so far as the conduct of hostilities is

150. Human Rights Council, The Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab
Republic, para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-17/1 (Aug. 23, 2011), at
http://www.un.org/Docs/joumal/asp/ws.asp?m-A/HRC/RES/S-17/1.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. First Report on Syria, supra note 6 para. 5.
154. H.R.C. Res. S-17/1, supra note 150, para. 12.
155. Id. para. 97.
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concerned.15 6 As to the definition of an armed conflict, the
Commission relied upon the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY),' 5 7 which, referred to protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups.15 ' The
Commission further specified that the Trial Chamber of the ICTY had
required a certain intensity of the conflict and a minimum level of
organization of the parties to the conflict.159 In its first report, the
Commission did not feel it was in a position to determine whether the
situation in Syria amounted to a non-international armed conflict
between March 2011 and the time of reporting on November 23,
2011.160 Consequently, the Commission only analyzed violations of
international human rights law and crimes against humanity, which
may have occurred irrespective of the existence of an armed

conflict. 16 1
The second report, which covers information received until
February 15, 2012,162 did not apply the law of armed conflict but
again limited itself to an application of international human rights law
and provisions on crimes against humanity.163 The Commission
expressed concern that "violence in certain areas may have reached
the requisite level of intensity" of an armed conflict,164 but it was
doubtful that opposition "armed groups had reached the necessary
level of organization."l 6 5 In its conclusions, however, the Commission
156. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 25 (July 8).
157. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
158. First Report on Syria, supra note 6 para. 98.
159. See, e.g., id. para 99; The Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. ICTY IT94-1-T, Judgment, paras. 561-68 (May 7, 1997).
160. First Report on Syria, supra note 6, para. 99.
161. Id. para. 100 ("[C]rimes against humanity may occur irrespective of the
existence of an armed conflict and the application of international humanitarian
law.").
162. Second Report on Syria, supra note 23, paras. 3, 6.
163. Id. paras. 1-3.
164. Id. para. 13.
165. Id.
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pointed out that "the Syrian Arab Republic is on the brink of an
internal armed conflict."1 66
The Commission's third report is based on investigations
conducted up until July 20, 2012.167 According to the Commission's
views the situation in Syria since the middle of February 2012 has
"evolved into an armed conflict."' 6 8 The Commission's determination
was based upon its assessment of "the intensity and duration of the
conflict" 69 and "the increased organizational capabilities of antiGovernment armed groups."o7 0 The consequences arising therefrom
are not entirely clear in the report. On the one hand, the Commission
applied international humanitarian law,' 7 ' and regarding the nine
explosions addressed in its report, stated that these "acts may be
linked to non-international armed conflict and thus assessed under
international humanitarian law." 72 In the same context the
Commission argues that these acts "are nevertheless domestic crimes
prosecutable under the Syrian criminal code," and that the
"Government is obliged to ensure that an investigation is conducted
impartially, promptly, effectively and independently, in accordance
with its international human rights obligations." 73 The Commission
also pointed out that "organized armed groups must ... abide by the
principles of international humanitarian law," and then went on to
refer to "gross abuses of human rights" and "international crimes."1 74
In its conclusion, the Commission clearly states, that "hostilities ...
have evolved into a non-international armed conflict." 75

166. Id. para. 122.
167. Third Report on Syria, supra note 26, para. 2. It should be noted that the
third report was drafted by only two commissioners, Paulo Pinheiro and Karen
Koning AbuZayd, due to the resignation of Yakin Ertdirk. See Press Release, supra
note 134.
168. Third Report on Syria, supra note 26, para. 4.
169. Id. paras. 3, 12.
170. Id. paras. 3, 12.
171. Id. paras. 12, 58.
172. Id. para. 62.
173. Id. para. 62.
174. Id. para. 134.
175. Id. para. 143.
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It is interesting that the third report of the Commission includes an
Annex of fifteen pages on the applicable law. 176 In the introductory
paragraphs thereof, the Commission repeats that it "has determined
that the intensity and duration of the conflict, combined with the
increased organizational capabilities of the Free Syrian Army, do, in
fact, meet the legal threshold for a non-international armed
conflict."' 7 7 The Commission, on this basis, concluded to apply the
law of armed conflict, "including Common Article 3, in its assessment
of the actions of the parties during hostilities."1 78
The fourth report of the Commission covers findings until January
15, 2013.179 According to the Commission, there has been "an
escalation in the armed conflict between Government forces and antiGovernment armed groups"' 8 0 since July 15, 2012, with a variety of
armed opposition groups involved. The Commission describes the
conflict as "increasingly sectarian" and also as "increasingly violent
and complex."' 8 ' In respect to territorial control, the Commission
points out that "the Government remained in control of the southern
and coastal governorates,"' 82 and "anti-Government armed groups
made substantial military gains in central and northern regions,
forcing the Government to cede control of several localities and
strategic junctions."' 83 Obviously, the Commission continued to
qualify the situation as a non-international armed conflict, stating that
among other things the "actors choosing to detain persons during
armed conflict [sic] must treat them humanely."l 84 Later, the
Commission stipulated that "[e]scalating violence in densely
populated urban areas has increasingly affected persons and objects
specifically protected under the laws of armed conflict." '85 Also, the
Commission affirmed that attacks on hospitals "are in violation of the
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. paras. 45-59.
Id. Annex II, para. 1.
Id. para. 3.
Fourth Report on Syria, supra note 33, para. 2.
Id. para. 1-2.
Id.
Id. Annex II, para. 2.
Id. para. 20.
Id. para. 66.
Id. para. 119.
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law of armed conflict and amount to the war crime of attacking
protected objects."' 86 In its conclusion, the Commission reiterated
that "[t]here is an evident escalation of the armed conflict between the
Government and anti-Government armed groups."' 87 It is noteworthy
that the Commission, thus, continued to apply its earlier assessment
made in its third report-that the situation amounts to a noninternational armed conflict-without, however, discussing this again
in its fourth report. Annex II attached to the fourth report provided an
overview of the military situation.' 8 8
In assessing whether the Commission's approach in defining the
existence of an "armed conflict" has been convincing, it is necessary
to consider the relevant rules of international law. Because the
situation in Syria clearly does not amount to an international armed
conflict, it is only necessary to consider the notion of "noninternational armed conflict." The starting point is Common Article 3
of the four Geneva Conventions (GCs), which applies to "armed
conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties." There is no doubt this includes
hostilities between governmental armed forces and non-governmental
armed groups.' 89 Not only is Syria a party to the four GCs,' 90 but the
Conventions have universally been ratified.191 Thus, the requirement

186. Id. para. 147.
187. Id. para. 167.
188. Id. paras. 45-59.
189. See Fr6d6ric Siordet, Conflicts Not of an International Character,in 1
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
AND SICK INARMED FORCES INTHE FIELD 37, 37-60 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1995).
190. Syria signed the Geneva Conventions on August 12, 1949, and ratified
them on November 2, 1953. See Syrian Arab Republic, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CRoss, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=SY (last visited Apr. 7,
2013).
191. For an overview of the Conventions, see Hans-Peter Gasser & Daniel
Thilrer, Geneva Conventions I-IV (1949), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INT'L LAW (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., 2011), available at www.mpepil.com. The
Conventions first became universal in 2006, with accessions by the Republic of
Nauru and the Republic of Montenegro (the latter effective from February 2, 2007
onwards). See Press Release, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of
1949 Achieve Universal Acceptance, ICRC Press Release 06/96 (Aug. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-andearlier/geneva-conventions-news-210806.htm. After the Republic of South Sudan
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that the armed conflict must occur "in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties" is met anyway. Beyond this, Common Article 3
of the GCs does not define "non-international armed conflict."1 9 2
There is, however, agreement that the situation covered by Common
Article 3 of the GCs must reach a certain threshold of confrontation.' 9 3
Indicators that the threshold has been reached include collective
hostilities and the need for the government to apply military force
rather than mere police force.' 94 Relying upon the phrase "parties to
the conflict," it is argued that non-governmental groups must possess
organized armed forces.195 This not only requires a command
structure but also the capacity to sustain military operations.' 96
The definition of a "non-international armed conflict" in Article 1
of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (AP II), sets a higher threshold for defining an "noninternational armed conflict" but is less far reaching.1 97 Even though
Syria is not a party to AP II, the differences with Common Article 3 of
the GCs may be briefly highlighted here. The AP II definition of noninternational armed conflict requires territorial control by the nongovernmental armed groups, and it only applies to armed conflicts
between governmental armed forces and dissident armed forces or
became independent on July 9, 2011, the Conventions again became universal with
the country's accession to the Conventions in July 2012. See Press Release, ICRC,
South Sudan: World's Newest Country Signs Up to the Geneva Conventions, ICRC
Press
Release
12/154,
(July
19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/south-sudan-news2012-07-09.htm.
192. Christine Gray, The Meaning of Armed Conflict: Non-International
Armed Conflict, in WHAT ISWAR? AN INVESTIGATION IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 69, 70
(Mary Ellen O'Connell ed., 2012); EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL
ARMED CONFLICTS 20 (2008).
193. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 38-40 (2002).
194. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 170 (Nov. 30,
2005) (noting that the two forces "were substantially engaged in their mutual
military struggle").
195. MOIR, supra note 193, at 36.
196. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term "Armed Conflict"
Defined
in
International
Humanitarian
Law?
(Mar.
17,
2008),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
197. Gray, supra note 192, at 71; LA HAYE, supra note 192, at 8-9.
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other organized armed groups.' 98 Only the notion of territorial control
by armed opposition groups might cause problems with regard to the
situation in Syria. However, AP II does not apply without Syria being
a party to it.

Recent international case law has confirmed the threshold
requirement and the need for organizational capabilities of nongovernmental armed groups. It has also further specified these
criteria. 199 In the Tadi6 decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber adopted
what has been characterized as "a generally low threshold"2 00 for
defining a "non-international armed conflict" under Common Article
3 of the GCs, but it introduced the notion of "protracted armed
violence." 20 1 A number of prominent commentators perceive this as a
mere reformulation of the threshold requirement. 202
In the Kordid & Cerkez decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
stated that the phrase "protracted armed violence" serves to exclude
mere cases of civil unrest. 203 The Tadi6 Trial Chamber then explicitly
referred to the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the
parties to the conflict. 204 This has subsequently developed into firm
198. MOIR, supra note 193, at 99-108.
199. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, supra note 194, para. 84.
200. Gray, supra note 192, at 73.
201. Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra note 157, para. 70. This notion is included in
Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: "It applies to
armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups."
Rome Statute of the Int'l Criminal Ct. art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
38544. For further interpretation of this clause, see Anthony Cullen, The Definition
of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 419, 43 5-45 (2007) (arguing in favor
of interpreting the threshold contained in Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute
identically to common Article 3 of the GCs).
202. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 239, 260 (2009); Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 370, 423 (Antonio

Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); Claus Kress, War Crimes
Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of
InternationalCriminalJustice, 30 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 103, 118 (2001).
203. Prosecutor v. Kordid & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, para.
341 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).
204. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, para. 562 (May 7,
1997).
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ICTY jurisprudence.2 0 5 The International Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR)
explicitly relied on the Tadi6 decision in the Akayesu case 206 and made
it clear that intensity had to be determined in an objective way, not
depending on the assessment of the parties to the conflict. 207
Subsequent case law of the ICTR followed this approach.20 8
The definition based upon Common Article 3 of the GCs, and not
the one included in Article 1 of the AP II, is also part of customary
international law. 209 Consequently, it can be argued that the
Commission's definition and approach to the concept of "noninternational armed conflict" based upon Common Article 3 of the
GCs is firmly rooted in accepted public international law. Its
application to Syria has largely met the approval of states and
pertinent international organizations. In particular, in July 2012, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considered the
Syrian conflict a "non-international armed conflict." 210

205. The following ICTY cases provide further support to the already cited
case law. See generally Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, para. 536 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Halilovi6, Case No. IT-01-48-T,
Judgment, para. 24 (Nov. 16, 2005); Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T,
Judgment, para. 9 (Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
Judgment, para. 560 (July 31, 2003).
206. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, para. 619-27
(Sept. 2, 1998).
207. Id. para. 603.
208. Gray, supra note 192, at 76-77.
209. ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 156 (2010).

ARMED

210. The ICRC is not competent to issue a legally binding statement on
whether there is a non-international armed conflict. See generally The ICRC's
Mandate and Mission: 29-10-2010 Overview, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct.

29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandatemission.htm. However, responding to a query during a meeting with the press,
ICRC spokesperson Hicharn Hassan stated: "There is a non-international armed
conflict in Syria. Not every place is affected, but it is not only limited to those three
areas, it has spread to several other areas." Stephanie Nebehay, Exclusive: Red
Cross ruling raises questions of Syrian war crimes, REUTERS (July 14, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/14/us-syria-crisis-icrcidUSBRE86DO9H2 0120714. In its first press release published after that interview,
the ICRC declared: "The ICRC concludes that there is currently a non-international
(internal) armed conflict occurring in Syria opposing Government Forces and a
number of organised armed opposition groups operating in several parts of the
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B. The Application ofHuman Rights Law in a Non-International
Armed Conflict
The Commission has not limited itself to an application of
international human rights law. Instead, from its third report onwards,
the Commission has made assessments on the basis of the law of
armed conflict. 2 1 1 The Commission sought to justify this approach in
the Annex attached to its third report because it could not rely upon an
explicit mandate of the HRC to apply the law of armed conflict. In
the opening section of Annex II, attached to the third report, the
Commission, referring to its determination of the situation in Syria as
a "non-international armed conflict," simply states, "With this
determination, the commission applied IHL, including Common
Article 3, in its assessment of the actions of the parties during
hostilities."2 12
The first question to be addressed here is whether the Commission
has the competence to apply the law of armed conflict, in particular
international humanitarian law. To repeat, the mandate for the
Commission, as adopted by the HRC, reads as follows:

country (including, but not limited to, Horns, Idlib and Hama)." Press Release,
ICRC, Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort Amid
2012),
available
at
(July
17,
Increasing
Fighting
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-0717.htm.
211. The terms "law of war," "law of armed conflict," and "international
humanitarian law" should not be used interchangeably. Being of relatively recent
origin and not being included in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the term
"international humanitarian law" focuses on so-called Geneva law (in contrast to
Hague law) and regulates the treatment of the individual in armed conflicts. See
Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 101, 104 (Dieter Fleck, ed.

2008) (discussing how the term "international humanitarian law" does not include
all of what has been known as "law of war" or "law of armed conflict", such as the
law of neutrality, not pursuing humanitarian purposes). Today these terms are often
used interchangeably, which puts necessary distinctions at risk. In this article, the
term "international humanitarian law" will be used when the protection of the
individual in armed conflicts is at issue. For the remainder, the "law of armed
conflict" or the "law of war" are the terms preferred by the author.
212. Fourth Report on Syria, supra note 33, at 38-41.
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[T]o investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law
since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and
circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes
perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a
view of ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that
may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable. 2 13
None of the subsequent resolutions, in which the HRC extended
the operation period of the Commission, explicitly extended the
Commission's mandate to the laws of war or international
humanitarian law. In Resolution 21/26, the HRC only sought to
follow up the Commission's reporting and stressed the need "to
conduct an international, transparent, independent and prompt
investigation into abuses and violations of international law, with a
view to hold to account those responsible for violations and abuses,
including those that may amount to crimes against humanity and war
crimes, ",214 thereby adding "war crimes" to the Commission's mandate
of inquiry. The Commission itself did not raise the question of its
own competence with regard to the application of international
humanitarian law as part of the law of armed conflict.
The question, whether the Commission acted outside its powers
by addressing violations of international humanitarian law in its third
and fourth report, arises in this context. To be clear, according to the
doctrine of ultra vires,2 15 this would not have rendered the fact-finding
activities of the Commission, the HRC, and eventually the U.N.,
invalid, because the overall mandate of the organization, i.e., the U.N.,
also includes the power to address violations of the law of armed
conflict. As has been rightly stated, acts of international organizations
remain valid if they are "intra vires the organization, though ultra
vires the particular organ." 216 Indeed, it can be said that fact-finding

213. H.R.C. Res. S-17/1, supra note 133, para. 13.
214. Human Rights Council Res. 21/26, para. 10, Situation of Human Rights
in the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/26 (Oct. 17, 2012), at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/Gl2/176/37/PDF/Gl217637.pdf?OpenElement.
215. Ultra vires is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as an "act performed
without any authority to act on the subject." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th

ed. 1991).
216.

CHITTHARANJAN

FELIX

AMERASINGHE,
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in respect to international peace and security falls within the
competences of the U.N. as a whole. However, whether or not the
HRC and the Commission are the appropriate bodies to address the
law of armed conflict is a different matter.
The Commission would have acted as the competent body if the
promotion of respect for international humanitarian law as part of the
law of armed conflict was an explicit or implicit task of the HRC,
which the Commission had integrated into its mandate. However, the
HRC was not established to ensure respect for international
humanitarian law. Its focus is international human rights law, 2 17 as
stated in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution establishing the
Council: "[T]he Council shall be responsible for promoting universal
respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and
equal manner." 218 Nowhere in the primary documents that establish
the HRC are any references to the law of war in general or
international humanitarian law more specifically. This does not,
however, exclude the implied powers2 19 of the HRC to address the law
of armed conflict. Whether this is convincing deserves further
consideration.
Because the HRC and the Commission do not have any
specifically mandated power in international humanitarian law, the
question of whether or not the Commission was competent to deal
with possible violations of international humanitarian law in Syria
depends on how the relationship between human rights law and
international humanitarian law is eventually defined. If international

INSTITUTIONAL

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

213

(2nd ed. 2005)

(containing further references, including the case law of the International Court of
Justice).
217. Beate Rudolf, United Nations Commission on Human Rights/United
Nations Human Rights Council (2008), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.

INT'L LAW, paras. 20-22, (Rdidiger Wolfrum ed., 2008), available at
http://www.mpepil.com.
218. G.A. Res. 60/251, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).
219. See Niels M. Blokker, International Organizations or Institutions,
Implied Powers, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW, para. 17

(Ridiger Wolfrum ed., 2009), available at http://www.mpepil.com ("While the
notion of implied powers of international organizations has been generally accepted,
there is no consensus about its precise scope.").
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humanitarian law cannot be completely separated from human rights
law, there may be some plausibility for the Commission to address
potential humanitarian law violations. Historically, international
human rights law and international humanitarian law have been
strictly separated.2 2 0 In contrast to this separation doctrine, new
approaches have been developed over the last few decades, which
focus on the overlap between these two bodies of law. 22 1 The starting
point of these developments is the recognition that universal and
regional human rights law have limited the power of state parties to
derogate from human rights in times of emergency, including
international and non-international armed conflict. 22 2 Among others,
Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) allows state parties:
[I]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, . . . [to] take

measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with
their other obligations under international law and do not involve

220. Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSs 501, 501 (2008) ("Traditionally, international
human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) are two distinct
bodies of law with different subject matters and different roots, and for a long time
they evolved without much mutual influence."). Until recently, this separation has
been applied, among others, by the Israeli Government. See Human Rights
Committee, Second Periodic Rep., Addendum, Isr., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., para. 8,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001), at http://www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/2ccOa33c394919eOcl256be9002e 1l88?Opendocument;
see
also U.N. Human Rights Committee, Response of the Human Rights Committee,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Isr., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/78/ISR
(Aug.
21,
2003),
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?OpenDocument.
221. For a discussion of these approaches, see, e.g., Christian Tomuschat,
Human Rights and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15 (2010);
Robert Cryer, The Interplay of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law-the
Approach of the I.C.T.Y., 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 511 (2009); Droege, supra
note 220; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction Between Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?, 19
EUR. J. INT'L L. 161 (2008).

222. Droege, supra note 220, at 507; Orakhelashvili, supra note 221, at 165.
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discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language,
religion or social origin. 223
On the other hand, the ICCPR clearly states that "[n]o derogation
from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be
made under this provision." 224 Non-derogable rights include the right
to life, the prohibition of torture and slavery, habeas corpus, due
process rights, and freedom of thought and religion. 2 25
With these in mind, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its
1996 advisory opinion on nuclear arms, observed that "the protection
of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war," 226 and stated that
"whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary
to Article 6 of the ICCPR, can only be decided by reference to the law
applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the
[ICCPR] itself."227 This approach, based upon the idea of lex
specialis,2 2 8 might also be read as overlap instead of placing the final
say on the legality of certain killings into the hands of international
humanitarian law.
In its 2004 assessment of the lawfulness of the construction of a
wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, the ICJ did not refine its
approach but more generally distinguished three modes of coexistence
between human rights law and international humanitarian law: "As
regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and
human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights
may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others
223. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
224. Id.
225. See Denise Plattner, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and Inalienable or
Non-DerogableHuman Rights, in DROITS INTANGIBLES ET ETATS D'EXCEPTION 349,

349-63 (Daniel Pr6mont ed., 1996) (discussing the relationship between nonderogable rights and international humanitarian law).
226. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 25 (July 8).
227. Id.
228. For more information on the application of the lex specialis doctrine to
the relationship between international human rights law and the law of armed
conflict, see Droege, supra note 220, at 522-24.
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may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be
matters of both these branches of international law." 229 This approach
was confirmed by the ICJ in its 2005 judgment on the dispute between
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, 230 and to a certain
extent, its decisions regarding the dispute between Georgia and
Russia. 23 1 Human rights courts have gone even further in this regard;
however, not without problems.2 32
Even if not fully sharing the approach of the ICJ, and less so the
European Court of Human Rights, it cannot be disputed that the theory
of strict separation between human rights law and international
humanitarian law has lost its persuasiveness. 233 With this in mind, the
Commission can draw legitimacy for addressing international
humanitarian law from the interface between the two bodies of law, in
particular in situations of non-international armed conflict. Thus, it
may be argued that the Commission did not act ultra vires; rather, it
made use of its implied powers and is sailing close to the wind.
Some questions arise regarding the Commission's definition of
"international humanitarian law."
Unfortunately, the opening
paragraph on the applicability of international humanitarian law is far
too general, by giving a general indication what this body of law
might include, rather than looking at which treaties actually apply to
the situation in Syria. This is particularly true for the Commission's
reference to AP 11.234 Only in the second paragraph on international
humanitarian law does the Commission clarify which rules apply to

229. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 106 (July 9).
230. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, para. 216 (Dec. 19).
231. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. 140, para. 112 (Oct.
15).
232. Cf Droege, supra note 220, at 510-18 (noting the problem of
extraterritorial application of international human rights law); Orakhelashvili, supra
note 221, at 170-74 (focusing on the right of life jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights).
233. Droege, supra note 220, at 501 (stating that international human rights
law and the law of armed conflict exercise mutual influence upon each other today).
234. Third Report on Syria, supra note 26, Annex II, para. 11.
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Syria,2 35 not only referring to specific treaty law, but above all to
"Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as well as customary
law relevant to non-international armed conflict." The Commission
also adds a special reference to U.N. Security Council Resolution
1325, which addresses the protection of women and girls in situations

of armed conflict. 2 36
However, this does not answer the question of to what extent
international human rights law continues to apply to a situation of
armed conflict. In its third report, the Commission had to determine
the extent to which international human rights law continued to apply
alongside the law of armed conflict. In the Annex on the applicable
law mentioned above, the Commission takes up this issue. The
Commission begins by stating, "The onset of IHL [international
humanitarian law] applicability does not replace existing obligations
under IHRL [international human rights law]; both regimes remain in
force and are generally considered as complementary and mutually
reinforcing." 237 Subsequently, the Commission does not distinguish
between the applicability of these distinct bodies of law, but in respect
to whether they "can be applied consistently." 238 According to the
Commission, whenever this is possible, "parties to a conflict are
obliged to do so." 2 39 If not, "the principle of lex specialis applies."24 0
In the subsequent paragraph, the Commission refers to international
criminal accountability, which may arise in cases of violations of both

bodies of law. 24 1
It is against this background that there is an additional argument
in favor of the Commission's approach to address violations of
international humanitarian law and the interpretation of its mandate,
since the mandate indeed refers to "the crimes perpetrated"; however,
it should also be noted that this phrase is linked to "violations of
international human rights law." 242 More specifically, the

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. para. 12.
Id. para. 13.
Id. para. 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 5.
Id. para. 6.
H.R.C. Res. S-17/1, supra note 133, para. 13.
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Commission, after its determination that the Syrian situation
amounted to a non-international armed conflict, not only referred to
non-derogable rights, but simply stated that the Syrian Government
"did not declare a state of emergency nor otherwise seek to derogate
from any of the aforementioned obligations which consequently
remained in effect throughout the conflict."2 4 3
It would go beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss each
and every aspect thereof, but it may suffice to provide a few examples.
In respect of unlawful killings, the Commission first notes that
international human rights law "strictly prohibits taking life
arbitrarily." 244 It then goes on to state that these "standards differ to a
degree from those applicable to fighters/combatants during an armed
conflict under IHL." 24 5 This is, to say the least, imprecise. Moreover,
it is misleading to state that "[s]o long as all applicable IHL, CIL
[customary international law] and IHRL requirements are met, killing
an enemy fighter during an armed conflict is not illegal." 246
The starting point of the law of armed conflict is that killing an
enemy fighter is lawful unless the law of armed conflict specifically
outlaws such killing; as to other persons, only so-called protected
persons, primarily civilians, are exempted from being the object of an
attack.2 47 However, it is unfortunately conceded that there is no
definition of a "combatant" in non-international armed conflict. 248
243. Third Report on Syria, supra note 26 Annex II. para. 8. In the following
parts of the Annex to its third report, the Commission specifically addressed the
excessive use of force, unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention,
enforced disappearances, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, rape and sexual
violence, children and armed conflict, pillaging, and destruction of personal
property. See id. paras. 28-68.
244. Id. para. 30.
245. Id. para. 32.
246. Id.
247. This refers to the principle of distinction. On its continued importance,
see Stefan Oeter, Comment: Is the Principle of Distinction Outdated?, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES: SYMPOSIUM IN

HONOUR OF KNUT ISPEN 53-62 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=WO4q7seH2007),
eds.,
SwC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs-ge-summaryjr&cad=0#v-onepage&q&frf
alse.
248. The explanation on Rule 3 of the ICRC's customary international law
study, dealing with combatants, explains the following on non-international armed
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The Commission, only at a relatively late point, makes it clear that the
law of armed conflict "prohibits the intentional targeting of civilians
in both international and non-international armed conflicts." 249
Unfortunately, there is no clear reference to the legal sources from
which these rules come. 2 50
Another example can be taken from the Commission's discussion
of arrest and detention. The pertinent section made no reference to the
law of armed conflict, and only the subsequent section on enforced
disappearances includes a reference to international humanitarian law;
albeit a very general one. The text states:
Under IHL, persons taking no active part in the hostilities are
entitled to be treated humanely. Customary IHL rules also include a
prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty and require parties to
the conflict to keep a register of persons deprived of their liberty,

conflicts: "Persons taking a direct part in hostilities in non-international armed
conflicts are sometimes labeled 'combatants'. . . this designation is only used in its
generic meaning and indicates that these persons do not enjoy the protection against
attack accorded to civilians . . . ." 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW: RULES 12 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al. eds., 2005). The Additional Protocol
II to the Geneva Conventions (not as such applicable to Syria) stipulates that the
"civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against
the dangers arising from military operations." Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts art. 13, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter AP
II]. The Additional Protocols I goes on to state an exception with regard to direct
participation: "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Id. This complicates the
application of the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflicts. See
Jann K. Kleffner, From 'Belligerents' to 'Fighters' and Civilians Directly
Participatingin Hostilities - on the Principle of Distinction in Non-International
Armed Conflicts One Hundred Years After the Second Hague Peace Conference, 54
NETH. INT'L L. REv. 315 (2007). The application of the principle of distinction to
the Gaza conflict has led to quite a few controversies in assessing the Goldstone
Report. See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Kot, Israeli Civilians Versus Palestinian
Combatants?Reading the Goldstone Report in Light of the Israeli Conception of the
PrincipleofDistinction, 24 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 961 (2011).
249. Third Report on Syria, supra note 26, Annex II para. 36.
250. For a comparative analysis of the protection from arbitrary deprivation of
life guaranteed under international human rights law and international humanitarian
law, including a discussion of Articles 51 and 57 of AP I, but not of Article 13 of AP
II, see Orakhelashvili, supra note 221, at 168-74.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss2/4

42

Marauhn: Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council Fact-Finding in S

2013]

SAILING CLOSE TO THE WIND ... THE CASE OF SYRIA

443

respect detainees' family life, to permit detainees to receive
visitors, especially near relatives to the degree practicable and allow
correspondence between detainees and their families. 251
Rather than carefully distinguishing between international human
rights law and the law of armed conflict, the Commission blurs the
lines between the two bodies of law. Additionally, the Commission is
not always careful to consider that the rules must be applied on its
own merits and that the object and purpose of these two bodies of law
is different.
In its fourth report, the Commission no longer seems to carefully
distinguish between human rights law and the law of armed conflict.
Rather, it seems to apply these bodies of law alongside each other,
which may be best illustrated by the following examples. The
Commission was required to investigate massacres, and as such,
provided a definition of a massacre that refers to both bodies of law
indifferently. A massacre is defined as "[a]n intentional mass killing
of civilians not directly participating in hostilities, or hors de combat
fighters, by organized armed forces or groups in a single incident, in
violation of international human rights or humanitarian law." 252
Regarding unlawful killings, the Commission addresses the
disintegration of "the State law enforcement and justice system," 25 3
and in this context states that "these mechanisms do not meet
international judicial standards as defined under international

humanitarian law." 2 54
These observations are not intended to put any individual
assessment of the Commission into question. They simply serve to
identify the lack of distinction between international human rights law
and the law of armed conflict. In effect, the Commission has blurred
the lines between international human rights law and the law of armed
conflict. Apart from raising very principled questions, which will be
addressed subsequently, 255 the Commission has treated fact-finding
with regard to possible human rights violations in the same way as

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Third Report on Syria, supra note 26, Annex II para. 48.
Fourth Report on Syria, supra note 33, para. 42.
Id. para. 63.
Id.
See infra Part III.D.
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fact-finding in respect of possible violations of the law of armed
conflict. This raises serious questions, not only as to the methodology
applied, but also about the reliability of the Commission's findings.
C. Fact-finding in Human Rights Law vs Fact-Findingwith Respect
to the Law ofArmed Conflict
Generally speaking, fact-finding is a traditional means of dispute
settlement in public international law. 2 56 Article 33 of the U.N.
Charter refers to an "enquiry," and Article 34 empowers the Council
to "investigate any dispute." 257 While its potential has been further
developed, its methodology has not necessarily done the same.
Simply defined in this regard, fact-finding is a "'method of
ascertaining facts' through the evaluation and compilation of various
information sources." 258
In recent years, fact-finding missions authorized by the U.N.
Secretary-General, the Council, or the HRC have become more
frequent. 2 59 This is particularly true with respect to alleged violations
256. Agnieszka

Jachec-Neale,

Fact-Finding, in

THE

MAX

PLANCK

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 1 (Riidiger Wolfrum ed.,

2008), available at http://www.mpepil.com ('Fact-finding' or 'inquiry' is a
recognized form of international dispute settlement through the process of
elucidating facts, given that it is the varied perceptions of these facts that often give
rise to the dispute in the first place.").
257. U.N. Charter arts. 33, 34.
258. Th6o Boutruche, Credible Fact-Findingand Allegations of International
HumanitarianLaw Violations, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 105, 106 (2011).
259. Quite a few analyses have since been provided. See, e.g., Christine M.
Chinkin, U.N. Human Rights Council Fact-FindingMissions, in LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE - ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN

475 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani ed., 2011); Micaela Frulli, Fact-Findingor Paving the
Road to Criminal Justice? Some Reflections on United Nations Commissions of
Inquiry, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1323 (2012). However, what is still lacking is a
comprehensive and critical assessment of mandate and methodology. See, e.g.,
Laurie R. Blank, FindingFacts but Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza
and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 279 (2010) (giving critical assessment of
the Goldstone Report). For an interesting approach in terms of methodology
(looking at best practices), see GERALD STEINBERG, ANNE HERZBERG & JORDAN
BERMAN, BEST PRACTICES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NGO FACTFINDING (2012). Some professors at the University of Leiden currently supervise a
research project, which looks more closely at the various methodologies applied to
fact-finding.
See
C.E.M.
Harwood: Profile, UNIVERSITEIT
LEIDEN,
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of human rights, and to some extent, of the law of war. Fact-finding
methodology differs greatly depending on the sponsor of the mission,
but also on the subject matter. Even similar missions do not
necessarily follow uniform methodology.2 6 0
This raises the question as to what extent fact-finding in human
rights law and fact-finding in the law of armed conflict differ, not only
in fact, but in law. With a view to the various missions that have been
initiated in recent years, it has been pointed out that "fact-finding may
at times comprise elements common in both IHL and human rights
law fields," but it is equally important to note that "differences exist,
particularly with regard to the techniques that vary depending on the
nature of the violations. "261
Since the facts covered by a fact-finding mission are framed by
the elements of the very rule allegedly violated, it is necessary to
distinguish between human rights law and international humanitarian
law. For example, the status of an individual as a civilian is important
in international humanitarian law in order to apply the principle of
distinction.26 2 This status does not, however, play a major role in
international human rights law. With respect to Syria, it has thus
rightly been pointed out that "the issue of correct identification
becomes crucial if the unrest in Syria does become a non-international
armed conflict." 263 Also, the principle of proportionality has a
different meaning in international human rights law than in
international humanitarian law. The latter involves a balancing
between the damage caused and military necessity, 264 while the former
raises the general question of whether a governmental measure
excessively burdens the individual compared to the benefits the
http://law.leiden.edu/organisation/publiclaw/publicinternationallaw/staff/catherineharwood.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) ("[R]esearch explores how international
fact-finding investigations in (post)conflict situations may be coordinated and
harmonised to strengthen international justice and accountability.").
260. See supra note 259, for different approaches reflected in the analysis.
261. Boutruche, supra note 258, at 107.
262. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
263. Annyssa Bellal & Louise Doswald-Beck, Evaluating the Use of Force
During the Arab Spring, 14 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 30 (2011).
264. On proportionality in the law of armed conflict, see Michael N. Schmitt,
Military Necessity and Humanity in InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Preserving
the DelicateBalance, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 795 (2010).
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measure aims to secure. 265 Thus, the scope and methodology of factfinding may depend on the applicable law; in other words,
"[i]nvestigating facts with an explicit or implicit link with violations
requires, to a certain extent, a minimum amount of legal evaluation,
for the mere purpose of defining the scope of the facts at stake." 2 66
The challenges involved in international humanitarian law factfinding, however, are much broader.
They begin with the
determination of when the law of armed conflict begins to apply and
when it stops applying. 2 67 As such, armed conflict further complicates
fact-finding. This includes security considerations for the mission
itself, not only during actual combat operations but also thereafter.
One such consideration is whether the area subject to an on-site visit
includes explosive remnants of war.268 Military classification may
limit access to information and testimonies may be extremely biased
in respect to armed conflict situations. 269 More important, perhaps, is
the risk that fact-finding in the context of an armed conflict may
compromise peace-building efforts though not necessarily to the
extent that efforts to fight impunity may hamper reconciliation. 270
The most serious challenges arise, however, from the relationship
between international humanitarian law and human rights law, and
"the difficulty of establishing violations by non-state actors." 271
First, international human rights law tends to be more general in
substance than international humanitarian law; the latter is often more
detailed and specific while its scope of application tends to be rather
limited. This does not exclude international humanitarian law from
making "reference to facts, often even plans or perceptions of facts
that are difficult to establish . . . ."272

265. For a critical assessment of the proportionality principle in the human
rights context, see Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human
Rights? (The Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 09/08, 2008), available at
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/08/08090 1.pdf.
266. Boutruche, supra note 258, at 112.
267. See id. at 120-121.
268. See id. at 121.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 122.
271. Id. at 123.
272. Id.
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Second, in a non-international armed conflict, it is a major
challenge to apply international humanitarian law to non-state
actors. 2 73 Even more so, ensuring compliance of armed groups with
this body of international law is problematic. 274 This is not to say that
these groups are unwilling to comply, but they find themselves
confronted with similar incentives for compliance and/or noncompliance as governments do. Furthermore, in addition to wellknown patterns of compliance and non-compliance, armed groups
cannot prepare in the same way for the situation in which they find
themselves. For purposes of fact-finding, it is difficult for a
commission to properly assess their actions, or to even to get hold of
the appropriate situation at all, as it may sometimes be difficult to
identify the person or persons in charge.
The third challenge that the Commission on Syria faced was the
lack of access to the territory and to information directly emerging
from the territory. 75 In light of the resistance of the Syrian
government to admit the Commission into its territory, the
Commission had no other choice but to rely upon interviews
conducted outside Syria, sometimes not even face-to-face, but through
technological means.2 7 6 The evidentiary value of such interviews is
relatively limited; especially in light of the fact that the Commission
can only interview limited groups of people: those who have the
privilege or capacity to leave the country, or who have access to
capable technology. 277
It is not disputed that certain facts could amount to a violation of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law

273. For a critical assessment of the proportionality principle in the human
rights context, see Tsakyrakis, supra note 265.
274. For an instructive discussion of incentives, see Olivier Bangerter,
Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect InternationalHumanitarianLaw or
Not, 93 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 882 (2011).

275. Fourth Report on Syria, supra note 33, para. 5 ("Lack of physical access
to the country undermined the commission's ability to fulfill its mandate. Its access
to Government officials and to members of the armed and security forces was
limited. Victims and witnesses inside the country, especially those allegedly abused
by anti-Government armed groups, could not be interviewed in person.").
276. See id. paras. 8-11.
277. See id. paras. 7-11 (detailing the methodology used in the report).
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The conclusions

D. Does Blurring the Lines Weaken Compliance with
the Applicable Law?
Against this background the question arises whether blurring the
lines weakens compliance with the applicable law. This question is
not only relevant from the perspective of the applicable law, but even
more so in light of the fact that fact-finding aims at enhancing
compliance with the appropriate body of law. Fact-finding does serve
to ensure accountability, perhaps even criminal responsibility, which
is not conducive to an environment of impunity. Further, fact-finding
also has a preventive effect. Particularly in situations of armed
conflict, it would be a misperception to reduce fact-finding in such a
way. Criminal law in general and international criminal law in
particular, deals with the repression of crimes and takes a
retrospective look at what happened. Fact-finding outside the ambit
of criminal law, however, steps in at an earlier stage and seeks to
enhance compliance with the law in the ongoing conflict rather than
only having an impact on future conflicts. 278 Preventing violations
and enhancing compliance thus is the focus of fact-finding. In this
sense, it strongly matters which body of the law is applied.
Treating human rights and humanitarian law alike and ignoring
their differences will indeed entail the risk of weakening compliance
with both bodies of the law.
For example, the right to life is protected under international
human rights law. 2 79 Arbitrary deprivation is unlawful.28 0 As far as
the protection of physical integrity below the threshold of killing is

278. As Michael Bothe has pointed out, "[c]ertainty about actual facts often is
a first step in ensuring compliance with an obligation." Michael Bothe, Fact-finding
as a Means of Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 249, 249 (Wolff

Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007).
279. For an overview, see Christian Tomuschat, The Right to Life: Legal and
Political Foundations, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE 3 (Christian Tomuschat et al. eds.,
2010).
280. ICCPR, supra note 223 at 174. The third sentence of Article 6(1) ICCPR
clearly states that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Id.
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concerned, international human rights law is largely limited to a
prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment (as safeguarded, among
others, by Article 7 of the ICCPR).28 1
International humanitarian law, however, takes a different
approach, it neither focuses on the right to life nor on the protection of
physical integrity, because the principle of distinction prohibits
making the civilian population the object of an attack.2 82 This
broadens the protection of the civilian population (compared to
international human rights law) in the sense that even if neither bodily
harm nor death occurs, an attack upon them is unlawful per se. 283
On the other hand, the protection is less stringent in that so-called
collateral damage may occur even if the principle of distinction is
respected.284
It is thus a misperception to simply argue that international human
rights law and international humanitarian law are complementary with
respect to the right to life. They are simply different and pursue a
different purpose. It is simply not convincing to generalize and argue
that international human rights law and international humanitarian law
both serve to protect human life. It is even misleading to argue that
"[t]here can be no doubt that the right to life has always provided the

281. Id. at 175. Article 7 of the ICCPR reads: "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no
one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation." Id.
282. On pertinent customary law obligations in times of non-international
armed conflict, see MOIR, supra note 193, at 139-44.
283. As can be taken from Article 13(2) of AP II, which as such does not
apply to Syria, but which may be considered customary international law: "The
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of
attack." AP II, supra note 248, art. 13(2). This is read as an "absolute obligation
applicable at all times." COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 1451 (Yves
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). The protection afforded by Article 13 of AP II and
pertinent customary international law requires "that precautions are taken both by
the party launching the attack during the planning, decision and action stages of the
attack, and by the party that is attacked." Id. at 1449.
284. Orakhelashvili, supra note 221, at 169 (taking a slightly different
approach in arguing that "humanitarian law serves as further elaboration of the
parameters of the right to life in armed conflict, and defines circumstances in which
the deprivation of life is or is not arbitrary.").
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background of IHL."28 5 Modem law of armed conflict seeks to
protect the civilian population from the effects of fighting, but it does
not call into question military necessity as a criterion for balancing.
The balancing is indeed between military necessity and, among others,
the protection of the civilian population; it is a misperception to state
"that IHL comes from an epoch when military thinking still largely
dominated its architecture," 286 to continue that this "is susceptible of
making a mockery of the entire carefully constructed edifice of
IHL," 28 7 and to then conclude that "one cannot place full trust in
traditional IHL without raising some questions." 288 Distinguishing
between the two areas of the law requires precision to ensure optimum
protection of not only, but primarily, the civilian population in
situations of armed conflict.
Another example regarding the situation in Syria is the conditions
for detaining individuals, even though the specific rules on prisoner of
war status only apply in international armed conflict, hence, not to
Syria. 289 There are major differences between international human
rights law and international humanitarian law with respect to detaining
individuals. International human rights law incorporates a full set of
habeas corpus principles, among others in Article 9 of the ICCPR.2 9 0
Treatment during detention is also governed by a particular set of
standards (included, among others, in Article 10 of the ICCPR),
focusing upon "humanity" and "respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person." 29 1 The object and purpose of these provisions again is
to protect the individual against arbitrary behavior of the government
285. Tomuschat, supra note 221, at 17.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. There is, however, agreement that detained fighters in non-international
armed conflict enjoy the minimum guarantees under Common Article 3 GCs since
they are "hors de combat" through detention. See MOIR, supra note 193, at 60.
290. Article 9(1) of the ICCPR reads: "Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law." ICCPR, supra note 223..
291. Article 10(1) of the ICCPR stipulates: "All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person." Id. art. 10(1).
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and to ensure his or her liberty. The law of armed conflict pursues a
different rationale, because its focus is not upon protecting the
individual against governmental measures, but upon treatment of
combatants and civilians by the enemy party.2 92 Detaining combatants
entails two distinct elements. First, their detention reduces the war
fighting capacity of the enemy party and thus serves military
purposes. 293 Second, combatants enjoy prisoner of war status with
appropriate standards of treatment during internment and with an
obligation to immediately release these prisoners when the armed
conflict comes to an end.29 4 Civilians, in situations of armed conflict,
may only be arrested for particular reasons, with a minimum of due
process standards as well as minimum standards of protection during
detention. 295 To a certain extent, these standards are similar to those
included in international human rights instruments. However, those
pertaining to combatants are not only different in terms of object and
purpose, but also in terms of substance. There is no defined status as
combatant in the law applicable to non-international armed conflicts,
which has given rise to an ongoing debate on the rules applicable to
detention.2 96

292. This can, among others, be taken from the notion of "protected persons,"
which typically concerns civilians in the hands of the enemy and prisoners of war.
See Catia Lopes & Noblle Qu6nivet, Individuals as Subjects of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 199, 213 (Roberta Arnold & Noelle Qu6nivet eds.,
2008).
293. As rightly stated by rule 701 of the German military manual, "prisoners
of war shall only be considered as captives detained for reasons of security, not as
criminals", meaning that detention serves "to prevent further participation in
military operations against the detaining power." Horst Fischer, Protection of
Prisonersof War, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 367,
373 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008).
294. Orakhelashvili, supra note 221, at 176 (referring to the U.N. Report on
Guantinamo Detainees (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120), and stating that, even with
regard to unlawful combatants, "detention under humanitarian law is merely
protective custody, unlawful combatants must be tried or released at the end of
hostilities.").
295. See Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103
AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (2009).
296. See generally Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed
Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 403 (2009).
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There are many more examples to illustrate the need for carefully
distinguishing between international human rights law and
international humanitarian law. They each have to be applied on their
own merits, with their own methodology, and by appropriately
mandated and experienced bodies. Only then do pertinent rules of
international law have a chance to be adequately applied and
hopefully complied with. As has been pointed out, there are at least
four major distinctions between international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, namely:
[H]umanitarian law only applies in times of armed conflict,
whereas human rights law applies at all times. Second, human
rights law and humanitarian law are traditionally binding on
different parties. While it is clear that humanitarian law is binding
for "parties to the conflict"--that is, both state authorities and nonstate parties.... Third, while most international human rights are
with few exceptions derogable, humanitarian law is nonderogable....
Lastly, there are considerable differences in
procedural and secondary rights, such as the right to an individual
remedy ... . 297
Indeed, in the case of Syria, and as far as the HRC is concerned,
also in other cases, the HRC and the Commission have contributed to
blurring the lines between international human rights law and
international humanitarian law.
Even if this has been wellintentioned-and there are some who would argue that this has been
politically motivated-it has not necessarily strengthened compliance
with the two distinct bodies of international law; rather, it has at least
equally weakened if not primarily weakened such compliance. Sailing
close to the wind may thus be assessed in rather critical terms.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF SAILING CLOSE TO THE WIND

This critical analysis would go too far if it only focused on the
negative effects of sailing close to the wind. 298 There are indeed some
297. Droege, supra note 220, at 521.
298. It must be taken into account that the inquiry started as an inquiry into
human rights violations. Therefore, even before the situation in Syria developed
into a non-international armed conflict commentators rightly pointed out that, in
such a situation, "the legal situation in Syria regarding use of force would probably
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benefits in the approach taken by the HRC and the Commission,
which must be highlighted here.
The second section of this paper explained that the organized
international community had its problems in even addressing the
uprising in Syria. 299 If the U.N. General Assembly and the HRC had
not put Syria on their respective agendas, the Council might not have
been in a position to follow suit. It was the pressure of other U.N.
organs that made the Council at least address the issue, even though
the Council's mission in Syria eventually was not successful in ending
the fighting (and one must add, not even in addressing possible
violations of either international human rights law or international
humanitarian law). It is thus important to recognize that the U.N.
General Assembly and the HRC deserve credit for putting potential
violations of the law in Syria on the agenda of the international
organized community. 300
At this point, one might take the position that violations of
international human rights law are a matter to be considered by the
HRC anyway. Indeed, the HRC is competent to do so, and it has
rightly established a fact-finding mission to consider human rights
violations. No other universal organ was in a comparable position to
do so, and no other universal organ is similarly experienced in the
field. One must bear in mind that the HRC and the Commission were
in a tremendously difficult situation when establishing the mission for
at least two primary reasons. First, the debate about Syria had been
extremely politicized in the sense that geostrategic aspects and
considerations of regime change made any assessment of human
rights violations a difficult matter per se. And, with the U.N.
Secretary-General having more or less openly taken sides against
Assad, the U.N. had lost some of its potential to mediate the conflict.
Second, the Commission has not had access to Syria, thus the means
of fact-finding were very limited from the outset.
When the situation in Syria developed into a non-international
armed conflict, the situation became even more difficult, and one may
actually make a good case here for the HRC and the Commission to
address international humanitarian law in addition to international
become more complex." Bellal & Doswald-Beck, supra note 263, at 7.
299. See supra Part II.
300. See supra Part II.
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human rights law. First, it would have been difficult to convey to the
international community had the HRC stopped its fact-finding
activities upon the uprising being qualified as a non-international
armed conflict. Second, unfortunately, the law of war does not have a
supervisory body at hand with the exception of the International
(Humanitarian) Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC) based upon
Article 90 of the Additional Protocols I (AP I).301
The IHFFC can also address non-international armed conflicts on
the basis of common Article 3 of the GCs, and has expressed its
willingness to do so. 30 2 Further, the IHFFC has a number of
advantages compared to HRC fact-finding, in particular, its
confidentiality. 3 03 Despite these two facts, the Commission so far has
not been mandated; even if Syria could have done so on an ad hoc
basis, Syria has not generally recognized the competence of the
IHFFC. This left the organized international community-and in
particular the Commission established by the HRC-in a difficult
position. Interpreting its mandate in a restrictive way, and limiting its

301.

See, e.g., Elzbieta Mikos-Skuza, The International Humanitarian Fact-

Finding Commission, in FRIEDEN IN FREIHEIT - FESTSCHRIFT FOR MICHAEL BOTHE
ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 481 (Andreas Fischer-Lescano, H.P. Gasser, T. Marauhn &

N. Ronzitti eds., 2008); Heike Spieker, International(Humanitarian)Fact-Finding
Commission, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW, (Riidiger

Wolfrum ed., 2011), available at www.mpepil.com; Charles H.B. Garraway, The
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, 34 COMMONWEALTH L.
BULL. 813 (2008).
301. Cf About Us-In a Few Words, INT'L HUMANITARIAN FACT-FINDING

COMMissioN, http://www.ihffc.org/index.asp?Language=en&page=aboutus-general
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
302. Id.
303. According to Art. 90(5) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, the Commission only reports to the parties, which have called upon it,
and the "Commission shall not report its findings publicly, unless all the Parties to
the conflict have requested the Commission to do so." Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 90(5), opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP 1]. Furthermore, there are explicit
provisions on confidentiality in Rules 18, 28 and 29 of the Rules of the International
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. Int'l Humanitarian Fact-Finding Comm'n,
Rules of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (last amended
2011), available at http://www.ihffc.org/index.asp?Language=EN&page=rul esof commission.
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review to possible violations of international human rights law would
have left possible violations of international humanitarian law
unaddressed. There were no signs of ad hoc fact-finding efforts nor
would the ICRC have been in a similar position to investigate, since
this is not the ICRC's primary responsibility (and it might have put its
unique capabilities at risk).
Thus, the Commission and the HRC deserve credit for taking up
the issues, and sailing close to the wind. However, they also deserve
criticism for not being sufficiently clear on the differences between
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
They not only put compliance with both bodies of law at risk by
blurring the lines, but they also put their own credibility at risk. A lot
depends on the credibility of the international body that is in charge of
such fact-finding. This notion of credibility extends across mandate,
methodology, expertise, and more.
There is a resulting sense of uneasiness that one is left with
towards the end of this critical analysis of fact-finding in Syria. In
terms of providing a forum, the HRC deserves credit; in terms of
substance, the HRC deserves criticism.
V. IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

This problem is, to a large extent, due to the lack of
comprehensive supervisory mechanisms in the law of armed conflict.
The three compliance mechanisms provided for in the GCs and AP I
have yet to be used, or are not currently being used for the purpose of
enhancing compliance with international humanitarian law. The
Protecting Powers mechanism as provided for in the GCs and in AP I
applies in international armed conflicts only,304 and it was last used

304. See AP I, supra note 303, art. 5(1) ("It is the duty of the Parties to a
conflict from the beginning of that conflict to secure the supervision and
implementation of the Conventions and of this Protocol by the application of the
system of Protecting Powers, including, inter alia, the designation and acceptance of
those Powers, in accordance with the following paragraphs. Protecting Powers shall
have the duty of safeguarding the interests of the Parties to the conflict."); see also,
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 126, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3516 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 143, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
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several decades ago. 305 Individual states have sought to use the formal
Enquiry Procedure that was already established in 1929, and
subsequently included in the GCs.306 Yet, none of the efforts have
resulted in its actual launching.3 07 Finally, the already-mentioned
IHFFC, based upon Article 90 of AP I, and established in 1991, has
not been triggered to date.
It is against this background that the 31st International Conference
of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent ("Conference") adopted
Resolution 31IC/I1/Ri on "Strengthening Legal Protection for
Victims of Armed Conflicts." 308 In this Resolution, the Conference
stressed "that greater compliance with international humanitarian law
is an indispensable prerequisite for improving the situation of victims
of armed conflict," and reaffirmed "the obligation of all States and all
parties to armed conflict to respect and ensure respect for international
humanitarian law in all circumstances." 309 The Conference invited:
[T]he ICRC to pursue further research, consultation and discussion
in cooperation with States and, if appropriate, other relevant actors,
including international and regional organisations, to identify and
propose a range of options and its recommendations to: i) ensure
that international humanitarian law remains practical and relevant
305. Hans-Joachim Heintze, Protecting Power, in THE MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 2009),

availableat www.mpepil.com.
306. The Enquiry procedure is included in articles 52 of Geneva Convention 1,
53 of Geneva Convention II, 132 of Geneva Convention III, and 149 of Geneva
Convention IV. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 52, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 53, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; GC III, supra note 304, art. 132; GC IV, supra
note 304, art. 149. See Jean Pictet, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF

WAR VICTIMS 73 (Leiden 1975), for examples of attempts to make use of the
enquiry procedure.
307. See generally Knut Dbrmann, Dissemination and Monitoring Compliance
of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, in INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW: FACING NEW

CHALLENGES 227, 237 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007).
308. ICRC, Strengthening Legal Protectionfor Victims of Armed Conflicts,
31IC/1 1/Ri (Nov. 28 -Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.rcrcconference.org/
docs.upl/en/RIStrengtheningIHLEN.pdf.
309. Id. pmbl.
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in providing legal protection to all persons deprived of their liberty
in relation to armed conflict; and ii) enhance and ensure the
effectiveness of mechanisms of compliance with international
humanitarian law .... 310
The Conference expressed its appreciation "to the government of
Switzerland for its commitment to explore and identify concrete ways
and means to strengthen the application of international humanitarian
law and reinforce dialogue on international humanitarian law issues
among States and other interested actors, in cooperation with the
ICRC." 31 ' This latter part of the resolution is the basis for the "SwissICRC Initiative to strengthen compliance with International
Humanitarian Law." 312
This initiative was launched in early 2012 with the first objective
to enable states to engage in a regular and systematic dialogue on
international humanitarian law issues, especially on strengthening and
compliance. As an initial step, the Swiss government and the ICRC
jointly developed a framework to invite states to an informal "Meeting
of States" in Geneva on July 13, 2012.313 On this occasion,
participants exchanged views on ways of strengthening compliance
with international humanitarian law and on possible ways forward.3 4
This state-driven process may put the responsibility of ensuring
compliance with the law of armed conflict back into the hands of
states. In its concluding remarks, the chair not only raised questions
about the ability of existing mechanism to meet today's challenges
with respect to compliance with international humanitarian law, but
the chair also identified institutional lacunae with regard to
international humanitarian law institutions and noted that states are

310. Id. para. 6.
311. Id. para. 7.
312. See Fed. Dep't of Foreign Affairs, Swiss-ICRC Initiative to Strengthen
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), SCHWEIZERISCHE
EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT,
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/
swieng/icrc.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
313. ICRC, Informal Meeting on Strengthening Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law, Concluding Remarks (July 13, 2012), available at
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/ihl.Par.0004.File.tmp/31.08.12_%
20ConcludingRemarks 13Julylogo.pdf.
314. See id. at 1.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

57

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2013], Art. 4

458 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

beginning to make use of other forums, such as the HRC and the
Security Council.3 1 5 With respect to these organs, the chair explicitly
stated:
[t]he attention these organs pay to IHL is positive. It shows an
increasing awareness of the international community for IHL matters.
However, as many delegations have noted, there are specificities of
armed conflict, and consequently of IHL application, which bodies
established under other branches of law are not able to fully address.
Due to these inherent limitations it will be necessary to examine
possible avenues for ensuring respect for IHL by means of IHL
compliance mechanisms.316
Delegations concurred that states lack a forum to regularly exchange
views on current international humanitarian law issues and there was
agreement to continue discussions and to enhance the ability of the
international community to ensure compliance with international
humanitarian law in a far better way than before.
CONCLUSION
The Commission and the pertinent resolutions of the HRC on
Syria underline the necessity to continue with the state-driven process
initiated by Switzerland and the ICRC in order not to just sail close to
the wind, but to have a distinct, competent, and credible fact-finding
mechanism for matters arising with respect to the law of armed
conflict. 317 Whether the IHFFC will come to play a major role within
this process is an open question. It is, however, currently the only
organ that is specialized in the law of armed conflict, and thus
competent to specifically address compliance with international
humanitarian law. To make the IHFFC operational beyond its
narrowly defined original mandate will, however, depend on the
political support coming from states, who in this particularly sensitive
area of international law are not only the most important actors, but
also those who must live up to their responsibility. They may
315. Id. at 2.

316. Id.
317. See Boutruche, supra note 258, at 106-08 (stressing credibility as a
crucial component to any meaningful fact-finding).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss2/4

58

Marauhn: Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council Fact-Finding in S

2013]

SAILING CLOSE TO THE WIND ... THE CASE OF SYRIA

459

eventually feel more prepared to do so in a state-driven process
(possibly with a sense of confidentiality), than in a process fully
conducted in the open and more designed to name and shame than to
assist and promote compliance.
Regarding the dramatic situation in Syria, the difficult question is
whether, and to what extent, the Commission could contribute to
improving the situation. While the Commission had to cope with the
worsening of the situation anyway, it sought not to ignore possible
violations of international humanitarian law. However, on the ground,
it seems pretty clear that the Commission could not contribute to
improve compliance with international humanitarian law. It may be
that, after the end of the conflict, it will be in a position to provide
information so as to avoid impunity. But in light of the limited
evidentiary value of the information collected, and in light of its
blurring the lines between human rights law and international
humanitarian law, even this seems doubtful. In addition, the conflict
in Syria is so politicized for many reasons that fact-finding with
reports to be published and, thus, fact-finding with an inherent
tendency to name and shame, might not contribute to improving the
situation on the ground. Confidential fact-finding might enhance trust
between the parties to the conflict and perhaps open a door for
mitigating the conflict. But this was not what the Commission could
nor what it wanted to do.
The HRC and the Commission on Syria have, by sailing close to
the wind, contributed to enhancing the debate on compliance with
international humanitarian law perhaps to a greater extent than
originally envisaged. One takeaway from the experience with the
Commission on Syria is that it is important to have a forum for not
only addressing possible violations of international human rights law,
but for dealing with possible violations of international humanitarian
law. The two bodies should, however, be more clearly separated from
each other-not just in theory, but in practice. This can also be taken
from the Commission's work. Otherwise, it must be feared that both
bodies of law and compliance therewith, will be weakened.
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